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The Dividend Puzzle: Are Shares Entitled to the Residual?
Daniel J.H. Greenwood*
ABSTRACT

Everyone knows that shareholders receive dividends because they are entitled to the
residual returns of a public corporation. Everyone is wrong.
Using the familiar economic model of the firm, I show that shareholders have no
special claim on corporate economic returns. No one has an entitlement to rents in a
capitalist system. Shareholders, the purely fungible providers of a purely fungible
commodity and a sunk cost, are particularly unlikely to be able to command a share of
economic profits or, indeed, any return at all.
Shareholders do win much of the corporate surplus. But this is not by market right or
moral entitlement. Rather, it is the result of a (possibly temporary) ideological victory in
a political battle over economic rents. Surprisingly, since corporate law often assumes a
conflict between shareholders and top management, shareholder gains flow from the
usefulness of the share-centered ideologies in justifying a tremendous shift of corporate
wealth from employees to top managers. Burgeoning CEO salaries are part of the same
phenomenon as high shareholder returns, not in opposition to it.
Taking the political nature of the corporation seriously will lead to a series of new
and important questions. Are current distributions of corporate wealth justifiable, or
should corporate governance treat lower-paid employees as citizens instead of subjects?
Why should only one side in a political conflict have the vote, and why per dollar instead
of per person? Given undemocratic internal corporate politics, are current levels of
deference to corporate autonomy justifiable?

. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, S.J. Quinney Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah;
J.D. Yale; A.B. Harvard. http://www.law.utah.edu/greenwood. Special thanks to Jill Fisch for convincing me to
develop the point, and to Kent Greenfield, Reiner Kraakman, Daniel Medwed, Joe Singer and participants at the
Faculty Workshops of Brooklyn Law School, Hofstra University School of Law, New York Law School and St.
John's Law School for helpful comments; the paper is much improved as a result. I am grateful for the financial
support of the S.J. Quinney College of Law Summer Research Fund and the time I spent and discussions I had
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I. INTRODUCTION
Everyone knows that shareholders receive dividends because they are entitled to the
residual returns of a public corporation. Everyone is wrong.
Corporate law scholars sharply disagree over the merits of the nexus of contract
theory, which emphasizes a metaphor of the corporation as a largely contractual moment
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in the market;I corporate-finance based views emphasizing that shares and bonds are
closely related and often interchangeable; 2 an older fiduciary duty based tradition, which
3
emphasizes the obligations of managers to work for their "principals," the shareholders;
and institutionalist views which emphasize information problems and the bureaucratic
functioning of the firm. 4 But nearly everyone agrees that the corporation exists to
generate wealth for shareholders. 5 Both those who claim that shareholders "own" the
1. This view has its locus classicus in Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972) (contending that firm is a purely
voluntary market phenomenon with no elements of coercion or fiat) and Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs. and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305 (1976) (describing the firm as a nexus of contracts and reduction of agency costs as the central issue). It
currently dominates the elite law schools despite criticisms dating back decades. See, e.g., KRAAKMAN ET AL,
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW (2004) (proclaiming and exemplifying hegemonic dominance of nexus of
contracts theory); William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:A CriticalAppraisal, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989) (surveying and criticizing the approach); Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of
Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974) (raising basic objections to an economic
approach).
2. For introductions to the corporate finance view, see WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES (9th ed. 2004); RICHARD A.
BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (8th ed. 2006).
Corporate finance theory emphasizes that the value of a security is dependent on the risk-adjusted present value
of future cash flows, regardless of whether the security is legally classified as stock, bond, or even a third-party
option contract to which the corporation is not a party. Accordingly, it teaches that both managers and investors
should view these various securities as largely interchangeable, despite the different legal roles they represent in
the corporation. Like the nexus of contracts view, corporate finance destabilizes the traditionally privileged
position of shareholders and thus undercuts the notion that corporations exist only for the benefit of
shareholders. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 815 (2006) (describing use of standard finance techniques to
allow separation of share voting rights from economic consequences of share ownership).
3. This tradition usually traces itself back to ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (LEGAL CLASSICS LIBRARY 1993) (1932), although modem uses of the
book seem radically different from the authors' understanding. See Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to
Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179
(2005). Berle and Means established the key point that shareholders in the modem corporation are better
understood as passive investors than as "owners" in the full legal sense. That insight underpins the Federal
securities regulatory system they inspired, which is largely based on a consumer protection model with
investors in the consumer role. However, in the modem debate, Berle and Means are most important for an
almost opposite idea: "the separation of ownership and control." Having established that shareholders in a
publicly traded corporation lack the legal and economic characteristics of ownership-control over the asset,
rights to make decisions, and ability to appropriate its profits-they then continued to refer to shareholders as
owners. See, BERLE & MEANS, supra, at 119. The metaphor of "equitable" ownership, as if the board of
directors were trustees for shareholders, id. at 247, has proven to have more staying power than Berle and
Means' alternative (and inconsistent) conclusion that modem corporations could no longer be viewed as private
property. Id. at 352-59. Some modem writers in the fiduciary duty tradition, following the Dodds side of the
great Berle-Dodds debate emphasize that fiduciary duties may run to more than merely shareholders. See, e.g.,
LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY (2001). However, the more common version is
symbolized by the famous dictum in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919), "[a] business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders." See infra note 16.
4. See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996) (describing the corporation as a
"shareholders cooperative"); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985)
(emphasizing transaction costs); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247 (1999) (describing corporate form as solution to worker's coordination problems).
5. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 668. But see Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del.
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firm and those who, following the nexus of contract theory, say that "ownership" is
meaningless in this context, 6 agree that shareholders are entitled to have the firm
operated in their interest. Indeed, even when the shareholders are the same people as
other firm participants-most corporate shareholders today are institutional investors,
which often also hold bonds and may also be fiduciaries for current or past employees at
the corporation, its suppliers, its customers or its competitors-courts and theorists alike
often assume that the firm should grant the shareholder role primacy. 7
Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, basic economic analysis of the modem
public corporation demonstrates that shareholders have no special claim on a
corporation's economic retums. 8 Economic profits are rents. No one has a pre-legal
entitlement to economic rents in a capitalist system. 9 Shareholders, the purely fungible
providers of a purely fungible commodity, are particularly unlikely to be able to
command a share of economic profits. Indeed, since the contribution of shareholders to
the firm is a sunk cost, in a competitive market, shareholders are unlikely to earn any
return at all. Accordingly, market-based analyses of the firm should conclude that
shareholder returns result from a market distortion.
1989) ("[W]e reject the argument that the only corporate threat posed by an all-shares, all-cash tender offer is
the possibility of inadequate value."). For academic discussion, see, e.g., Kent Greenfield, New Principlesfor
CorporateLaw, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 87, 87-88 (2005) (summarizing state of the debate); Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for CorporateLaw, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (contending that sharecentrism has won the debate).
6. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 1, n.14. For example, note that shareholders need not be considered
owners but can be thought of as investors like bondholders. More fundamentally, much of modem corporate
finance is based on Miller and Modigliani's insight that, from the perspective of the firm, equity and debt are
largely interchangeable, and the firm's value is largely independent of which it uses to finance itself. Merton H.
Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411 (1961);
Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-MillerPropositionsAfter Thirty Years, in THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE
FINANCE 129, 132-54 (Joel M. Stern and Donald H. Chew, Jr., eds., 2003). If bonds and shares are
interchangeable, of course, the "ownership" rights of shareholders must be unimportant. Cf David Ellerman,
The Role of Capital in "Capitalist" and in Labor-Managed Firms (Dec. 2004) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-633722 (noting that economic understanding of the firm as a production
function does not imply that "capital" owns the firm in the sense of being the residual claimant). Even the
standard Brealey et al. corporate finance textbook, which assumes throughout that managers ought to be
maximizing shareholder return, mysteriously states that the firm "should try to minimize the present value of all
taxes paid on corporate income . . .includ[ing] personal taxes paid by bondholder and shareholders," as if
bondholders had precisely the same status as shareholders. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 473. They do not
explain why tax avoidance should be a firm goal, why firms should view themselves as aliens exempt from
responsibilities incumbent on all citizens, or why shareholder and bondholder taxes are different from personal
taxes paid by suppliers, customers, or employees; apparently it is self-evident that the firm should consider as
its own concern the personal finances of these financial investors, but not other factors of production.
7. Perhaps the most dramatic judicial proclamation of shareholder primacy is Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182-83 (Del. 1986), in which the court enjoined certain
defensive measures in a hostile takeover because they favored bondholders over shareholders, without regard to
whether bondholders were helped more than shareholders were hurt, even though the facts made clear that the
two groups heavily overlapped and without more detailed information on actual holdings it was impossible to
tell whether investors would view their bond or share holdings as more important.
8. See infra Part Il.
9. On the concept of "rents" as used in the public choice and law and economics literature, see, for
example, Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical"
Practiceof the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 227 (1988) (describing rent-seeking, when it is
worthy of condemnation, and ambiguities in concept).
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Similarly, black-letter legal doctrine makes clear that shareholders have the same
legal right to dividends as waiters have to tips: an expectation that is not enforceable in
court. Metaphorical claims that shareholders are "owners" suffering from a "separation of
ownership and control" or "principals" suffering from "agency costs," or even "trust
beneficiaries," conceal but do not overcome the legal reality. Shareholders have political
voting rights in the organization, not the rights of an owner of property, a principal in an
agency relationship or a beneficiary of a trust.
The implications are clear. Shareholders win some of the corporate surplus not by
market right or moral entitlement, but due to a (possibly temporary) ideological victory in
a political battle over economic rents. Surprisingly, since conventional wisdom portrays
corporate law as a conflict between shareholders and top management, those conflicts are
dwarfed by the common interest of the two groups. Shareholder returns are largely the
consequence of managers finding the share-centered ideologies useful as an ideological
justification for a tremendous shift of corporate wealth from employees to the
CEO/shareholder alliance.
Standard metaphors of the public corporation as a trust, an agency relationship, a
nexus of contracts, a piece of property or a person conceal the internal political struggles
over corporate surplus and the weakness of shareholder claims to appropriate it. Taking
the corporation's political nature seriously, in contrast, leads to a series of new insights
and related questions. If the struggle over corporate surplus is a political struggle over
economic rents, why should only one side, the shareholders, have the vote? In a
democratic society, why should those votes be allocated on a per-dollar basis, instead of a
per-person basis? Indeed, to the extent that shareholders are only a role, and market
forces make it a limited and narrow role, is it plausible to believe that the stock market is
often a reasonable proxy for the public good? Most fundamentally, why should we, the
citizens of the United States, allow our major economic actors-which are also among
our most important governing institutions-to treat their employees-us-as foreigners
and outsiders, denied not only the vote but even a legitimate claim to the surplus they
help create?
In the last several decades, virtually all corporate gains from productivity have gone
to shareholders and CEOs, while ordinary employee wages have remained flat or
declined. 10 This system is obviously not well designed to generate employee loyalty to
the firm (or the firm productivity that follows): employees not given a fair share of the
wealth they help produce are eventually likely to notice, and employees who view
themselves as exploited are unlikely to cooperate fully in their exploitation. Nor is the
10. The problem has been noted by many commentators, both inside the large corporate sector of the
economy that is my focus here and more generally. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Feeling No Pain, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2006, at A2 1.
Between 1979 and 2003, according to a recent research paper published by the I.R.S., the share of
overall income received by the bottom eighty percent of taxpayers fell from fifty percent to barely
over forty percent. The main winners from this upward redistribution of income were a tiny,
wealthy elite: more than half the income share lost by the bottom eighty percent was gained by
just one-fourth of 1 percent of the population, people with incomes of at least $750,000 in 2003.
Id. For a general discussion of the changes in distribution of wealth and income in the United States over the
last two generations, see EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: A STUDY OF THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF
WEALTH INAMERICA (1995).
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rapidly growing gap between the elite and the rest of us healthy for republican
democracy: if the rich really are different from the rest of us, the common enterprise of
nationhood fails. If shareholders have no special claim to corporate rents, then existing
corporate governance is not only dysfunctional but simply unfair.
All is not lost, however. If the share-centered corporation is not the inevitable result
of ineluctable economic law, we are free to adopt different corporate governance rules
giving other participants more power, making firms both more just and more likely to
succeed in their basic wealth-creation task. 1 Allocations of surplus have no efficiency
implications. Thus, we need not fear a tradeoff between "efficiency" and justice:
reforming the internal political processes of our corporations to make them better reflect
basic democratic values should not lead to loss of wealth. On the contrary, just as
democratic political systems more consistently generate wealth than dictatorial ones,
expanding corporate democracy should increase the firm's productivity.
II. THE PROBLEM
In the last third of the Nineteenth Century, American law abandoned its earlier
understanding that corporations, endowed with special privileges by the legislature, were
inherently public in their purposes and quasi-governmental in their operations.12 In the
great divide of liberal political theory between state and citizen, public and private,
corporations began to be seen as private, less a part of the state than requiring protection
from it, more like citizens than their governments. 13 Indeed, by 1886, the Supreme Court
was so immersed in this privatized conception that it felt no need to justify granting
corporations the rights of human beings under the Fourteenth Amendment; the seminal
Santa Claraopinion offers no reasoning whatsoever. 14
11. As an aside, a realistic understanding of the corporate struggle over allocation of surplus suggests that
the corporate income tax needs to be rethought. Current tax law presumes that payments to all factors of
production, other than shares, are business expenses reducing profits, while all payments to shareholders are
made out of profits. A more realistic system might deny deductibility to any payment to an employee that is
greater than, say, five times the median wage on the theory that any payment so high is likely to contain profits.
Conversely, it might grant deductibility for dividends paid to shareholders so long as they are less than some
reasonable level, such as the three month T-bill rate plus a 3% risk premium, calculated on the actual amount
contributed by shareholders (i.e., par value or the original public offering amount). More radically, we might
abandon the inherently complex attempt to define "income" for entities and instead shift corporate taxation to a
VAT or equivalent.
12. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 111-14
(1977) (describing the transition from public to private theories of corporation); HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 13-14 (1991) (describing the transition from mercantilist to
classical model of corporation); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, EssentialSpeech: Why CorporateSpeech is not Free,
83 IOWA L. REV. 995 (1998).
13. Cf Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1059, 1075-76, 1100-02 (1980)
(describing differentiation of municipal from business corporations and classification of former as public, latter
as private).
14. Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., Co., 118 U.S. 394, 409 (1886). See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 65-109 (1992) (describing Santa Clara's prefiguring of
later theories of corporate personality). From Bank of Augusta v. Earle to Pembina, the Supreme Court
consistently upheld differential taxes on corporations: corporations were not citizens. Bank of Augusta v. Earle,
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587 (1839); Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S.
181, 187 (1888). From Allgeyer on, however, business corporations are given essentially the same rights against
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Similarly, corporate purposes were reconceptualized. Corporations were no longer
understood as existing to promote important public projects, but rather to promote the
private interests of their particular participants-even though the largest corporations of
the period, the railroads, were engaged in an enterprise of extraordinary public
importance, were the beneficiaries of massive land grants and other public subsidies, and
were collective enterprises of a scale previously unknown to American governments. On
the new analysis, this private, self-interested endeavor would be required to serve the
public good, if at all, only by means of Adam Smith's invisible hand, not by any
conscious public spiritedness or deliberate consideration of the needs of the public. 15 By
the turn of the twentieth century, the state generally abandoned the attempt to control
corporations through corporate law, instead using external regulatory law, offering them
subsidies or otherwise relieving them of the rigors of the market.
In this world of private public corporations aiming for profit, the obvious question
arises: which corporate participants will be allowed to benefit from the surplus the firm
generates? The most famous answer appears in Dodge v. FordMotor Co.: "[A] business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the shareholders. The
powers of the directors are to be employed to that end. The discretion of directors ...
16
does not extend to a change in the end itself."
But Dodge is an outlier. 17 Since the first of the recognizably modem general
business corporation laws at the turn of the century, the basic rule instead has been that
corporations choose their own ends and police them internally, with almost no judicial or
other state intervention. Modem laws permit corporations to be formed "for any lawful

the government as people, generally without any discussion whatsoever of whether assimilating firms to
citizens is appropriate. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897); see HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 47
(discussing cases and transition in legal conceptions of corporation person); Greenwood, supra note 12 (arguing
that rights given to corporations often diminish the rights of their participants); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, First
Amendment Imperialism, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 659 (discussing expansion of speech rights, asserted by
corporations, into doctrinal territory of Lochner-like assertion of "natural" markets); Carl J. Mayer,
Personalizingthe Impersonal: Corporationsand the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990) (describing
cases granting corporations constitutional rights).
15. Adam Smith himself, of course, wrote that corporations would never serve the public good; however,
he was working within the older, public, paradigm of corporations. ADAM SMITH, INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE
AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Oxford University Press
1976) (Corporations "very seldom succeed[) without an exclusive privilege; and frequently have not succeeded
with one. Without an exclusive privilege they have commonly mismanaged the trade. With an exclusive
privilege they have both mismanaged and confined it."). Early 19th century Americans frequently shared this
distrust of the large corporation. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 23 (describing Jeffersonian hostility
to corporations); JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE UNITED STATES

30-45 (1970) (describing suspicions of Gouge (1833) and others regarding corporations, echoing Smith almost
verbatim).
16. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 685 (Mich. 1919) (ordering board of directors to declare a
dividend despite their own views and views of majority shareholder). Although Dodge is perhaps the most
extreme judicial statement of the privatized view of the corporation as existing solely for the benefit of its
shareholders, the general attitude was, and remains, common. See also ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 5, 9 (1932) (describing the rise of the modem

"quasi-public" corporation, but perceiving this as a problem because corporations were no longer subject to "the
old assumption that the quest for profits will spur the owner of industrial property to its effective use").
17. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 4, at 301 (describing Dodge as "highly unusual").
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purpose." 18 Moreover, governance of the firm virtually is the exclusive province of the
board; judicial supervision is limited by the extreme deference to board decision-making
embodied in the business judgment rule. 19 Thus, in contrast to Dodge's external
command, the usual rule stresses the firm's autonomy. The board of directors of a
corporation has extraordinary flexibility in determining how to apply any surplus the firm
may earn.
A. Economic and Accounting Profit Contrasted
To discuss shareholder returns, it is first necessary to clarify terms. Profit is an
ambiguous term. Common accounting understandings confuse two separate issues:
whether the firm is earning a return, on the one hand, and which firm participants are
receiving the return, on the other.
A successful firm is one that creates a surplus, by which I mean that it could sell its
product for more than it must pay its various inputs. In the standard jargon, this surplus is
the "residual" or "economic profit." A firm that is able to produce a product or service
which can be sold for more than the market value of the various inputs is a firm that is
20
successfully creating value-what it produces is worth more than what it consumes.
Economic profit, so defined, is quite different from the more familiar accounting or
legal profit bookkeeping concepts. Accounting profit is equal to the sum of properly
declared dividends plus so-called retained earnings (referring, roughly speaking, to funds
the corporation holds but has not allocated to any corporate participant). 2 1 On the other
side of the ledger, all payments made to corporate participants, other than dividends,
reduce accounting profit. Thus, any amount the firm pays its employees, any amount the
firm does not obtain from its customers, and any amount the firm pays its investors in the
form of interest, each reduce accounting profits. Dividends, in contrast, are treated as if
they were not costs at all.
The accounting view is not a realistic picture of the corporation's economic success
from a social perspective. When a firm needs capital to create its product, the price of that
capital is a cost just like all other costs. If it earns an accounting profit insufficient to
allow it to pay dividends sufficient to attract the capital it needs, it fails just as surely as if
18. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP.ACT § 3.01(a) (1984) (stating "[e]very corporation incorporated under this
Act has the purpose of engaging in any lawful business .. ")[hereinafter RMBCA]; cf DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102 (2006) (voiding prior doctrine regarding limited corporate purposes).
19. Current Delaware law enshrines the principle of directorial supremacy in § 141(a)'s proclamation that
"[t]he business and affairs of every corporation ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006). The business judgment rule, best understood as a form of
judicial deference analogous to judicial deference to agency and legislative decisions, similarly ensures that
directors are the primary corporate decision-makers. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Beyond the CounterMajoritarianDifficulty: Judicial Decision-Making in a Polynomic World, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 781 (2001)
(discussing judicial deference in these and other contexts).
20. See infra note 43.
21. Retained earnings do not, however, represent a fund available for payments to shareholders, despite
older misunderstandings to that effect. On the one hand, the corporation may choose or market pressures may
constrain it to distribute retained earnings to other corporate constituencies in the form of increased payments to
other inputs or decreased prices to customers. On the other hand, dividends may be paid out of other sources,
including future earnings, economic profit, borrowing, or sales of assets. Indeed, retained earnings do not
represent a fund at all. They are not, for example, a synonym for cash on hand or liquid investments.
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it is unable to pay market wages or market price for raw materials. Conversely, if a firm
is able to sell its product for more than the costs of its inputs, it is successful, even if it
pays out that surplus in some form other than dividends.
Economic profit classifies normal (market) returns as a cost to any input, including
capital, regardless of legal label or accounting treatment. Similarly, economic profit
classifies as profit any payment to any input in excess of the market price necessary to
acquire that input, regardless of accounting treatment. Thus, on the economic view, what
counts is not the firm's actual payments for inputs but the market cost for those inputs
(including the cost of acquiring capital); not the price it actually does receive but the
price it could obtain; not what it does with its surplus but the size of the surplus in the
first place. On this view, any part of dividends or interest that is necessary to obtain
capital on the market is a cost. Any payment above that necessary cost is part of the
firm's economic profits (which has been distributed to bondholders or shareholders
respectively).
In short, economic profit is a theoretical measure of the surplus available to the
corporation to be distributed among its various participants, inputs, patrons or customers,
while accounting or legal profit is a formal measure of the funds distributed to
shareholders in the form of dividends or classified by the firm as retained earnings. The
distinction should be familiar. Before check-the-box taxation, it would have been
surprising to see a successful closely held corporation report an accounting profit;
publicly traded corporations often manipulate accounting conventions to the opposite
22
effect.
In a theoretical fully-competitive market, of course, prices are driven down to costs.
It follows that, as I have defined it, economic profit is a disequilibrium producer's
surplus: an imbalance in the market in which price is (or could be, at the seller's option)
higher than cost.
When economic profit exists, typically it will be difficult to calculate, because
is
surpluses exist only when markets are less than perfectly competitive, and if a market 23
well.
as
imprecise
be
may
products
and
inputs
of
price
market
the
imperfect,
22. See, e.g., Kamin v. Am. Express, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (upholding accounting
treatment that management believed would improve stock market perceptions of profit, despite consequence of
higher income tax obligation). Since the development of the LLC and "check the box" pass-through taxation,
closely-held firms generally can elect not to pay entity-level tax without manipulating accounting profit labels.
However, manipulating labels remains important for other reasons. Leveraged buyouts, for example, which pay
out surplus in the form of interest, were highly effective in convincing employees to accept a smaller share of
corporate surplus: employees who might have protested had the company insisted it needed employee givebacks in order to increase its profits were willing to pitch in to stave off bankruptcy, even when the cash flows
were identical transfers of a slice of the corporate pie from employees to capital. Similarly, CEOs of publicly
traded companies discovered that stock-option grants allowed them to transfer corporate surplus to themselves
with minimum publicity and, until recent reforms, no impact on reported profits.
23. In competitive markets, each input will be priced at (or marginally above) its value in its next most
profitable use, and the product should be priced at (or marginally below) the cost of production of the next
lowest cost producer. At that level, the firm will have as large a supply of inputs and be able to sell as much of
its product as it wishes. A firm earning an economic profit is one that can pay those prices and sell at that price
and have something left over; it is more efficient than its competitors. As other firms learn, they should compete
away that advantage. However, in less competitive markets, firms may be able to earn economic rents-i.e., sell
their product for more than economic costs-for extended periods of time. This Article is concerned with the
distribution of those rents or surpluses. In a fully competitive market at equilibrium, there are no surpluses; if
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Nonetheless, the concept is essential. Economic profit is the pie that is available for
distribution, the fund which can be struggled over, regardless of where it ends up.
B. Who Owns the Economic Profit?
It is fundamental to the very notion of corporate existence that any economic profit
or surplus belongs in the first instance to the corporation itself, and not to any of its
various participants. 24 Accordingly, it is the corporation's board or its delegates,
operating as the decision-makers for the institution itself, who decide what to do with this
25
economic surplus and how to classify it for legal purposes.
Rather than declare a dividend, the board and executives 26 may decide to reinvest
economic profits-that is, to increase the firm's contractual obligations, thereby
distributing the former period's profit to the next period's corporate contractual
participants. They may pay it to employees in the form of higher salaries or increased
managerial benefits. They may distribute it to creditors by paying debt before it is legally
due or in the form of interest on new debt. They may distribute it to customers by
reducing sales prices or to suppliers by increasing purchase prices. They may decide to
simply retain it in the corporate bank account or other financial investments. Or they may
decide to distribute it to shareholders, by means of a dividend, dissolution of the firm or a
stock buyback.
If the board chooses to retain the economic surplus in the corporation's name
beyond the end of an accounting period or distributes it to shareholders, the economic
surplus will become profit in the accounting and legal sense. But nothing forces a board
to do that. If it prefers not to have accounting profit, it can simply increase its contractual
obligations during the period in which the surplus is eamed. 27 In this case, no profit will

any factor of production (including capital) succeeds in demanding more than competitors pay, the firm will be
driven out of business.
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (2006) (granting corporation, inter alia, powers of permanent succession,
ownership, contracting, etc.). Individual shareholders have no right to dissolve a corporation or otherwise force
the corporation to distribute any of its assets to the shareholder. See, e.g., id. § 275 (dissolution of corporation is
by resolution of the board followed by vote of shareholders). In contrast, in a partnership, any partner has the
right at any time to demand his or her pro rata share of the partnership assets (including, of course, any surplus
from prior periods). See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 31 (1997) [hereinafter U.P.A.] (granting every partner the
right to dissolve the partnership even in contravention of partnership agreement); id. § 38 (granting every
partner on dissolution rights to pro rata share of partnership assets, except that wrongfully dissolving partners
are not entitled to share in value of goodwill).
25. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2006) (business and affairs of every corporation managed by or under
direction of its board); id. § 170 (board may declare and pay dividends, subject to certain restrictions); RMBCA
§ 8.01(b) ("all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of its board"); id. § 6.40(a) (stating
that board may authorize distributions to the shareholders, subject to certain restrictions).
26. Hereafter, I will generally refer just to the board-with the understanding that in practice most
relevant decisions will be made in the first instance by executives and many may never even be submitted to the
board for ratification. For current purposes, the specific allocation of power between board and executives
seems unimportant.
27. Precisely the same problem arises in the corporate income tax context. The income tax is levied on
profit, defined as revenues less expenses allowable as deductions. Corporations, therefore, may be tempted to
reduce their taxable profits (and therefore taxes) by classifying as "expenses" payments greater than those
required by the market. Most obviously, a shareholder CEO will minimize taxes by paying economic profit to
herself in her CEO role as salary, rather than in her shareholder role as dividends. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(a)(1)
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ever appear on the corporation's books. Instead, prices will be lower or input costs will
28
be higher than necessary.
Legal restrictions on this board discretion are few. Shareholders have a legal right to
the surplus only after the board of directors declares a dividend. 29 The duty of care
requires the board to give due consideration before deciding to act (or not act). 30 The
duty of loyalty prevents the board from giving away corporate assets without receiving an
appropriate quid pro quo. 3 1 Within these broad constraints, boards are free to do what
seems right in their eyes.
Even where the duties of care or loyalty might seem to restrict board discretion,
however, the business judgment rule severely limits judicial review of board decisions. In
effect, courts police only insider deals, in which a dominant shareholder or other insider
receives corporate assets on terms not available to others. 32 Even then, courts mainly
look for secret deals, routinely declining to second-guess the decisions of informed

(2000) (allowing corporate deduction for "reasonable" executive compensation, even when the executive is also
a (or the sole) shareholder). In contrast, payments to a partner of a partnership are ordinarily classified as profit,
even if the partner contributed time to the partnership. See U.P.A. § 18.
28. For several years, the standard corporate finance text explicitly asserted that "retained earnings are
additional capital invested by shareholders, and represent, in effect, a compulsory issue of shares." RICHARD A.
BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 324 (4th ed. 1991); RICHARD A.
BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 364 (5th ed. 1996). Obviously this is

not true in any literal sense. Retained earnings result when sales proceeds and other income exceed costs and
other expenses; not shareholder contributions or share issuance. Instead, Brealey & Myers mean it
metaphorically: as they explain, "a firm which retains $1 million could have paid the cash out as dividends and
then sold new common shares to raise the same amount of additional capital." Id. To be sure, a firm could have
done that. But money is fungible, and firms can obtain it from many sources. Generally, corporate law allows
dividends to be paid out of "surplus," which may be any portion so designated of the net assets of the
corporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154. In effect, so long as the firm remains solvent, it may pay
out any funds it has as dividends. For example, a firm with retained earnings could borrow money and
immediately pay it out as dividends, or it could reduce employee pay (or, more easily, fail to increase employee
pay to match increases in productivity) and pay that cash out as dividends. On the Brealey & Myers logic-that
any money which could have been paid out as dividends should be treated as if it were a shareholder capital
contribution-shareholders should be deemed to have contributed these amounts as well! In Brealey & Myers's
world, the shareholders magically create all value in the firm, regardless of the contributions of others. Of
course, a less shareholder-sympathetic view could use the same logic to reach the opposite conclusion. Thus,
the firm could also have paid out its retained earnings or any other available cash as salary, bonuses to
suppliers, discounts to customers, or made any other legal use of it, and then borrowed or sold shares to raise
the same amount of capital. So, we could just as well say that retained earnings were contributed by employees
and represent a compulsory reduction of salary. This shareholder claim to corporate funds is no more than
Sophistic spin.
29. See supra notes 25-26; cf RMBCA § 6.40(0 (declaring dividends treated as an unsecured debt to the
shareholders at parity with other unsecured debt).
30. Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); RMBCA § 8.30 (setting out duty of directors to act
in good faith and in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation).
31. RMBCA § 8.31 (lifting director's protection against suit for breach of duty of loyalty on, inter alia,
showing of lack of objectivity due to a conflict of interest); id. § 8.60 (setting out requirements for actions
challenging director's conflicting interest transactions); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156
(Del. 1995) (setting out a procedural test for determining possible breaches of duty of loyalty); In re
Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S'holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194, 1201-06 (Del. Ch. 1995) (similar).
32. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (defending business judgment rule on ground that
judicial abstention promotes risk taking by managers).
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independent directors. 33 Thus, no American court has yet set any limit to the amount a
public corporation's fully informed board may publicly pay its CEO, even in the absence
of any evidence that the board had any basis to think the CEO's services could not have
been obtained for less. 34 As long as the board does not appear to be unduly influenced by
the CEO, modem courts do not intervene, even if the firm appears to be giving the bulk
of its economic profits to the CEO-just as courts during the unionized age did not
intervene when companies appeared to be acting primarily in the interests of unionized
employees and mid-level managers, or when companies have adopted 35as their primary
goal promoting their product or even a particular way of doing business.
In short, the board has legal discretion to treat the economic profits-the residualin virtually any way it pleases.
C. Who Should Get the Residual?
Nonetheless, commentators and courts routinely ask what the board should do with
the corporation's profits. And36 the answer has seemed obvious to many: profits are
rightfully for the shareholders.
But economic profits are rents, and as a general rule, no one has a moral entitlement
to rents. When cooperation creates a surplus in a market economy, normally we assume
that the parties are free to bargain for any division of it. If shareholders can win some of
the surplus, all power to them. But if they cannot, they have nothing to complain about.
As we shall see, however, it is virtually inconceivable that shareholders would be able to
win a share of the rents in a competitive market. Shareholder returns, therefore, must be
the result of a non-competitive process that cannot be legitimated by market claims.
33. See, e.g., KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 114-18 (describing the largely procedural approach of
fiduciary duty law). Even the leading case finding liability follows this procedural approach of never suggesting
a limit on the right of a fully informed board to operate the corporation in the interests of any party it chooses.
See Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d at 893 (finding uninformed board liable). The RMBCA permits a conflicting
interest transaction to stand if it is either approved by a majority of informed, unconflicted directors or
shareholders, or it is entirely fair to the corporation. RMBCA § 8.61-.62.
34. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 n.56 (Del. 2000) (noting that there is a point at which executive
compensation becomes actionable waste, but according "great deference" to board judgment because the "size
and structure of executive compensation are inherently matters ofjudgment"); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., No. CIV.A.15452, 2005 WL 2056651 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005) (similar proposition).
35. Corporations have been managed with different primary goals in different periods. See, e.g., BERLE &
MEANS, supra note 3, at 67 (discussing instances in which corporations were managed on behalf of the
"control" rather than passive shareholders); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 175,

181, 186, 207, 222 (4th ed. 1985) (1967) (contending that major corporations were, at that time, managed on
behalf of the institution's own autonomy-and thus its employees, growth and stability-with little concern for
consumers or shareholders). Courts have also declined to intervene when managers have described their goals
as furthering the interests of the product or even particular ways of doing business, rather than any human party.
See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1144 n.4 (Del. 1989) (stating that outside
directors sought to run corporation in order best to protect "Time Culture"); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548
(Del. 1964) (appearing to approve company's dedication to a particular sales method).
36. Even Lynn Stout, who has questioned most aspects of the shareholder-primacy model in the course of
de-essentializing the fictional shareholder, continues to assume that ultimately the goal of every corporation
should be to make money for shareholders. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments For
ShareholderPrimacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002). For a recent survey of the remarkable consensus in favor
of the shareholder-centric model of the corporation, see Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The
Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and CorporateLaw, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 39-41 (2004).
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Shareholders are not entitled to profits by law. They are not entitled to them by
economic right. Are they entitled to them at all?
III.

THE MARKET MODEL: THE DIVIDEND MYSTERY

37
In standard nexus of contract and most other economically oriented models,
shareholders are viewed as a factor of production like all other factors of production in
the firm. 38 Firms need capital (among other things) in order to produce their product, and
they purchase or rent that capital in the capital markets. 39 Roughly speaking, they
purchase capital by selling stock; they rent it by issuing debt.

37. Modem economically oriented models of the corporation come in a wide variety of forms. Classic
models took the firm as a "black box," treating it as if it were a single producer without investigating its internal
dynamics. Coase argued that this obfuscated the issue of why firms exist in the first place, which he contended
could only be due to an efficiency advantage resulting from eliminating the market's pricing mechanism
internally. Firms, thus, should exist where the market generates poor results and administration ("fiat" in his
terms) can generate better ones. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), reprinted in
R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 33-57 (1988), and in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS,
EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 18-33 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991).
Theorists have since developed Coase's insight in several different directions. Institutional economics
focuses on the internal dynamics of the firm. Williamson's transaction cost economics focuses particularly on
the microeconomics of contract failure that might lead to firms. See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE
NATURE OF THE FIRM (1991); WILLIAMSON, supra note 4. Hansmann has used a similar approach to explore
corporate governance and, importantly for this Article's analysis, distribution of ownership rights in the firm.
See generally HANSMANN, supra note 4. More recently, Blair & Stout have emphasized the role of the
corporation as a "mediating hierarchy" in resolving such problems of team production, and Stout has begun to
consider the implications of abandoning the fiction that shareholders have a single and uniform interest. Blair &
Stout, supra note 4; Lynn Stout & Margaret Blair, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate
Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719 (2006); see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are
Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996) (arguing that the fiction of a unified
shareholder interest serves as an ideological justification for lack of corporate democracy). Others, such as
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 1, and Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, and their followers, have gone in the
opposite direction, treating the firm itself as no more than a moment in the market, a nexus of contracts
understandable without any need to refer to the institution itself. This approach was early-on critiqued for its
mystification by Arthur Left and Bill Bratton, supra note 1, but nevertheless its market reductionism proved
quite popular, reaching its quintessence in books by Roberta Romano and Easterbrook & Fischel. See generally,
FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); ROBERTA
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993). Recent market-based theories have sought to
apply the insights of sophisticated behavioral finance theorists such as Andrei Shleifer to model the behavior of
shareholders, thought of primarily as participants in a finance market rather than "owners" of a company.
Communitarians, including Larry Mitchell, have emphasized the importance of trust and its social bases, often
assumed and therefore neglected in older economic models. See, e.g., Lawrence Mitchell, The Importance of
Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 591 (2001). Mark Roe has usefully emphasized that efficiency considerations
always exist within a particular political framework, so that market evolution may lead to different results in
different contexts. See generally MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
38. HANSMANN, supranote 4, at 12-16 (treating firm as a capital cooperative). This Article maybe seen as
a claim that the market problems identified by Williamson and Hansmann as reasons for the firm structure we
see-principally, lock-in, asymmetric information and marginal/average cost difference problems-have not, in
fact, been solved by the existing legal structures.
39. See, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 445 (describing the full interchangeability of debt and
equity financing under Miller and Modigliani's proposition 1, and partial interchangeability under competing
theories).
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Treating the stockholders as a factor of production that has sold capital to the firm
has the heuristic advantage of emphasizing that, from the firm's perspective, the capital
market is a market like all others, in which an array of commodities is for sale or rent at a
variety of market-determined prices. Here, as in any competitive commodity market, a
purchaser (i.e., the firm) has no reason to pay anything more than the competitive price,
and that should equal its marginal cost of production. Thus, we can state the puzzle:
Shareholders are perfectly fungible providers of the most perfectly fungible of
commodities (cash and some risk-bearing services), in our most competitive of
markets. A priori, then, one would expect that they would receive no more than
the market price for their product, which should equal its marginal cost of
production.
If so, it is surprising to find that shareholders expect to share in any excess returns
the firm may obtain. Rather, one would expect that any disequilibrium or monopoly firm
profits would be retained by the firm itself or go to a firm participant with disequilibrium
or monopoly power. Public shareholders-because they are fully fungible providers of a
fully fungible commodity in a highly competitive market-are the least likely firm
participants to have that kind of power.
Bond holders and bank lenders are in fact paid precisely in this manner: they receive
a fee that is closely related to the general cost of producing money (i.e., general interest
rates), adjusted to reflect the expected risk of the particular firm. They do not expect to
participate in extraordinary firm earnings, except perhaps to the extent that such earnings
reduce risk for which the creditors have already been compensated. But equity is harder
to understand.
A. Full Competitive Equilibrium
First, some background. Under standard economic models, a firm selling a
commodity product in a fully competitive equilibrium market must sell its product at a
price equal to the marginal cost of production of the lowest-cost firm. If it sets its price
any higher, customers will purchase from a competitor and it will fail. This is normally
expressed in standard black box models by stating that a firm in fully competitive
markets earns no economic profit.
At equilibrium there can be no internal distribution issues within the firm. Each
factor of production must be paid no more than its lowest cost on the market. If any factor
of production were to successfully demand more than its replacement cost, it would,
parasite-like, kill its host. The firm would have higher costs of production than its
competitors and be unable to compete.
Capital is no different than labor or raw materials in this model. It must be paid the
lowest possible amount necessary to generate the minimum capital required to run the
company-that is, capital may be paid no more than its cost of production in a
competitive market. If it is paid more than that, the firm's costs will be higher than its
competitors and it will be unable to price its product competitively, leading to failure.
Actually, shareholders should expect even less. In competitive markets, prices
normally adjust to marginal cost. Equity capital usually will be a sunk cost with a
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marginal cost of zero. 40 Shareholders, then, should expect no return at all at competitive
equilibrium. Consider the following.
B. The Sunk Costs Problem Generally
It is a commonplace of economic theory that when marginal costs are lower than
average costs with respect to real factors of production, prices will reflect only the
marginal costs. 4 1 When this occurs, the firm will be operating at a long-term loss, and the
result should be market failure. Either the product will not be produced, a monopoly will
avoid market pricing, or allocation by market prices will be replaced by a non-market
process such as administrative allocation inside a firm. 42 This is said to be the problem
that drove the American railroads out of business (and continues to be a regular problem
in high fixed cost businesses such as telecoms and airlines). 43 It once motivated J. P.
Morgan's attempts to end "ruinous price wars" by consolidation. 44 Later, it underpinned
New Deal "natural monopoly" theories. And Coase famously contended that avoiding it
45
is the major reason firms exist.
1. Market Pricingat Marginal,Not Average, Cost
To see the problem, imagine a simplified firm using capital, labor and raw material
inputs to produce widgets. Assume that a single employee operating a single widgetmaking machine can produce one-hundred widgets from one unit of proto-widget raw
material. The cost of producing one-hundred widgets, then, consists of variable costs of
one unit of proto-widget and one day of labor, plus the fixed costs associated with the
machine (roughly, the cost of the machine divided by the number of widgets it can be
expected to make over its useful life).
Ex ante, of course, no one would invest in the machine unless they expected to be
able to charge a price for widgets sufficiently above the variable costs to cover the costs
of the machine (and some extra for the effort). Thus, internal accounting will always
include a cost for the machine itself, typically in the form of amortization of fixed costs,
and firms normally will calculate their per-widget costs on an average basis.
But ex post, after the machines are in place, the calculation changes. If the firm has a
machine sitting idle, the cost of producing an extra batch of widgets is determined only
by the variable costs. The machine adds nothing to the firm's cost of producing these
hundred widgets, nor does leaving it idle save anything. In other words, the marginal cost
of producing an additional hundred widgets is simply one unit of proto-widget and one
day of labor. A firm faced with the choice of leaving the factory idle or dropping prices to
40. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 33, 53, 263 (1985) (emphasizing the importance of relative
asset specificity in creating contracting problems and possible institutional resolutions).
41. See, e.g., Ronald Coase, The Marginal Cost Controversy, 13 ECONOMICA 169 (New Series, 1946)
(discussing the relationship between marginal and average costs).
42. Coase, supranote 37.
43.

See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE & SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM

56-58 (1990) (describing sunk cost problem as central to the economic history of larger American
corporations); JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A
REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 55-78 (2003) (describing history of corporate form).
44. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 43, at 62 (describing J.P. Morgan).
45. Coase, supranote 37 (criticizing New Deal understandings of monopoly).
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increase demand will find that it will make more money (or lose less) if it drops prices to
just above marginal (variable) cost and keeps producing. Moreover, closing down, like
death, often results in quick deterioration. By staying in operation, the firm preserves
employee networks and loyalty while keeping the equipment from rusting away from
neglect.
But if one firm drops its prices to just above its marginal costs, in a competitive
market all firms will be forced to match. With prices at marginal cost, producing firms
will not be charging customers for the cost of the (old) machines and (anticipating similar
problems in the next period) will not invest in new ones.
2. GeneralSolutions
Often we solve this problem by tax-financed subsidies (as in agriculture, highways
and single family mortgages), legally imposed monopoly rights or similar barriers to
entry (as in much of the utility and hospital industries, or in pharmaceuticals, software
and other industries dependent on the legal monopolies of patent or copyright) or stateadministered price fixing (trucking, agriculture, many forms of insurance, etc.). Absent
governmental intervention, market failure can take several forms. One possibility is that
the various firms will drive each other out of business or that entrepreneurs, foreseeing
the problem ex ante, will never invest in the first place. The product simply will not be
produced, despite technical feasibility, willing buyers and potentially willing sellers. The
best example of this in the United States may be passenger rail service.
Alternatively, the market may solve the sunk cost problem by eliminating
competition through monopoly or at least partially price-fixed oligopoly. This was J.P.
Morgan's solution to "ruinous price wars": to reorganize industries into a limited number
of players which could then raise prices sufficiently to cover fixed costs (and then
some). 46 In other industries, monopolistic pricing power may stem from cascades, such
as the one that allows Microsoft to price Windows well above its marginal cost (which is
roughly zero). 47 Many industries with significant sunk costs settle into oligopoly-the
common phenomenon of two or three major producers seen in areas dominated by the old
trusts (breakfast cereals, sugar, steel, oil), services (banking, Bar reviews) or new
helps to avoid fully
commodities (computer hardware and software, electronics)
48
competitive pricing that would be below average cost.
However, monopoly profits attract competitors, so if costs of entry are relatively low
or price-fixing agreements are difficult to enforce, new entrants (or old competitors

46. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 43.

47. A cascade occurs when consumers derive value from using the same product as others, independent of
the merits of the underlying choice. It matters far more, for example, that we choose the same side of the road,
instant message service, keyboard, or computer operating system than that we make the right choice. Brian
Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, SC. AM., Feb. 1990, at 92. Indeed, even where there is no obvious

advantage to standardization, it still often remains more important to go to the same movies, listen to the same
music, wear the same clothes, or join the same club as our peers than it is to find the best of those products. See,
e.g., Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L..

835, 892 (1980) (describing this

phenomenon in the context of country clubs). When a cascade occurs, the producer of the favored product may
be able to charge monopoly prices despite the existence of competitors. Even if the competing product has

similar technical specifications, without the customer base, it cannot provide true substitutability.
48. See generally CHANDLER, supra note 43.
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tempted to cheat in order to increase volume) will constantly threaten comfortably high
pricing. The result may be an industry without an equilibrium, gyrating madly between
excess monopoly profits and competitive bankruptcy as firms enter and depart, with
prices rarely matching either marginal or average costs. Think of our semi-deregulated
airlines, California's electric markets or farmers selling commodity agricultural produce
before the New Deal price support system.
Finally, some industries may be able to eliminate the sunk cost problem by
eliminating sunk costs. The more an industry uses flexible, readily re-allocable physical
capital, the less it needs to worry about the difference between marginal and average
costs. Companies using generic machine tools controlled by ordinary computers do not
face the same issues as old-fashioned rust-belt dedicated factories. If the equipment can
be resold, marginal cost includes the opportunity costs of not selling it, thus bringing
marginal cost closer to average cost.
Similarly, even where the equipment itself remains highly specific, competitive
industries may develop around it. Doctors, for example, avoid the sunk cost problem
because their expensive non-redeployable equipment is owned by hospitals (which, in
turn, often have local monopolies). Lawyers need not form monopolistic firms because
much of the physical capital they need is either socialized (courts) or outsourced and
49
oligopolistic (Westlaw and Lexis).
C. FinancialCapitalas a Sunk Cost
The fixed capital problem is generally discussed in terms of real assets-widget
machines, airplanes, railroad tracks, CT-scanners, law libraries, fiber optics lines or
electric plants. But it applies to purely financial assets as well. Securities and similar
liquid assets held in the corporation's name are easily redeployed, so rational managers
should price them at their opportunity cost (i.e., the most profitable available alternative
use), which is therefore their effective marginal cost.
In contrast, the equity contributed by stockholders to a public firm is a sunk cost.
Stockholders have no legally enforceable right to a dividend. Thus, there is no legal cost
to using funds shareholders contributed to the firm in the past. Conversely, there is little
opportunity cost: the corporation cannot profit from not using past public offering
proceeds either. Thus, unless stockholders have some extra-legal ability to demand
payment, the firm's marginal cost of continuing to use the assets stockholders have
invested is nil. If shareholder claims have no marginal cost, they should command no
return in a competitive market. Any firm that increased its prices to create a fund from
which to pay shareholders would have to charge more than its marginal costs and
therefore, in a competitive market, more than its competitors. That would put it out of
business.
Accordingly, no part of a corporation's earnings in a competitive market at
equilibrium is attributable to shareholders' contribution. On the contrary, all positive
earnings must be attributed to different inputs that do have positive marginal costs. At
competitive equilibrium the corporation will not only fail to earn economic profits (by
definition), it will fail to earn legal profits representing a normal return to equity capital.

49.

HANSMANN, supra note 4, at 96.
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Since this claim is so counter-intuitive-after all, shareholders do pay good money in the
expectation of future returns-let us take the argument more slowly.
1. ShareholdersHave No Legal/ContractualRight to Distributions
First, shareholders have no legally enforceable right to a dividend or other
distribution from the firm. As a matter of formal law, this is clear. Shareholders have no
right to any interim payments for the continued use of their capital and firms have no
legal obligation ever to declare a dividend or any other distribution, even if there is a
surplus available to do so. The decision to declare a dividend rests in the exclusive
5°
discretion of the board.
Perhaps even more fundamentally, shareholders have no legal right to their money
back. Quite unlike standard partnership law, which provides that each partner has the
unalienable right to withdraw his capital at any time, 5 1 corporate law gives shareholders
no opportunity to regain their capital except by decision of the firm's directors. To be
sure, shareholders generally have the right to sell their shares to someone else, but this
transaction does not withdraw funds from the firm. 52 The corporation continues to hold
the capital paid by the initial stock purchaser regardless of what happens in the secondary
market. 53 The only way for shareholders to get a return of the capital they have
contributed is for the firm to decide-by vote of its board of directors-to repurchase its
shares or declare a liquidating dividend. 54 Shareholders, that is, may have political power
to vote for directors or lobby them, but they have no legal entitlement to any particular
result.
Early corporate law seems to have assumed that firms would be created for a
specific project (such as a particular trading voyage) and last for a limited period, after
which they would wind up, distributing the original contributions and any accumulated
profits (or losses) to the shareholders. 55 Dividends were thought of as interim payments
50. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006) (determining that business and affairs of every
corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors); id. § 170(a) (granting
directors sole power to declare dividends).
51. See, e.g., U.P.A. § 31 (permitting any individual partner to dissolve partnership at any time, in
accordance with or in breach of the partnership agreement); id. § 38 (granting each partner at any time the right
to either a winding up and distribution of the surplus or to payment of the "value of his interest in the
partnership").
52. See, e.g., RMBCA § 6.27(a) (authorizing corporation to impose restrictions on transferability of
shares).
53. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court's suggestion in Bellotti that a shareholder unhappy with managerial
actions (in that case, political contributions) can withdraw at any time is based on a misunderstanding of
corporate law. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978).
54. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (authorizing corporation to purchase and redeem its own stock);
id. § 170 (allowing board to declare dividend); id. § 244 (allowing board to reduce capital); RMBCA § 12.02
(requiring board resolution followed by shareholder vote for certain dispositions of substantial assets); id.
§ 14.02 (providing that dissolution requires board resolution followed by shareholder vote). The fact that
shareholders have no claim on funds that remain inside the firm underlies the standard corporate finance
theorem that the value of public shares is no more than the present value of the expected future dividends. See,
e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 64.

55. The expectation prior to the mid-nineteenth century was that business firms (generally not
incorporated) would exist only for a short period to complete a specified task, such as a single shipping trip.
After each trip, the firm would be wound up and the profits distributed to investor/owners even if the
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against this final settling up.
In sharp contrast, modem corporate law assumes the firm will last indefinitely and
does not provide for winding up after a particular project or a given amount of time. 56 If
a firm declares a dividend or similar distribution, or decides to wind up, the shareholders
generally have a right to a pro rata share of the dividend or the residual on winding up
after other claimants are paid. 57 But this right exists only after the firm's board-not the
shareholders-has declared the dividend or decided to wind up. There is no equivalent to
shareholders lack even a
the right of individual partners to cause dissolution. Indeed,
58
so.
do
to
board
the
order
to
or
dissolve
to
right
collective
Moreover, distributions to shareholders are always subject to the prior claims of
parties with contractual claims on the corporation. 59 But contracts do not just appear as
an act of God. The board has exclusive authority to cause the corporation to enter into

contracts or to authorize its agents, the employees, to do so. That means that not only
may the board refuse to declare dividends from legal profits, it may even decide that the
firm will never have unencumbered funds from which shareholder distributions could

legally be made. 60 In short, as far as the text of modem business corporation laws is
concerned, a corporation could exist indefinitely without ever making any payment at all
with respect to its shares. Of course, that a firm is permitted to fail to declare a dividend

expectation was that the same individuals would participate in the next ship. Even firms without obvious endpoints were normally organized with limited life spans: recall, for example, the Jacksonian controversy over the
rechartering of the Second Bank of the United States. See, e.g., HURST, supra note 15, at 25 (stating that most
early charters set "sharp limits on corporate life"). Similarly, until near the end of the nineteenth century,
business corporations were ordinarily restricted to a single, narrowly defined purpose. E.g., id. at 44.
Partnership law retains this presumption in its provisions for dissolution of the partnership and requirement of
unanimous consent for any fundamental change in the business. See, e.g., U.P.A. § 18(h) (requiring unanimous
consent for changes to partnership agreement); id. § 18(g) (requiring unanimous consent of existing partners for
any person to become a partner); id. § 31 (permitting any partner to dissolve partnership at any time, in
accordance with, or in breach of the partnership agreement); id. § 38 (granting each partner at any.time the right
to either a winding up and distribution of the surplus, or to payment of the "value of his interest in. the
partnership").
56. Modem corporate law allows corporations to be organized for any or every lawful purpose, and to
change purpose without shareholder consent, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(3) (voiding prior doctrine
regarding limited purposes of corporations), permits a corporation to exist indefinitely, see, e.g., id. § 122(1)
(providing for perpetual succession), and places power of dissolution in the corporation itself. See, e.g., id. §
122(7) (granting corporation power to wind itself up).
57. See, e.g., id. § 151 (providing that classes of stock shall have the rights, preferences, etc., specified in
the articles or applicable board resolution).
58. See, e.g., Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1191 (Del. Ch. 1998) (upholding pleading that
"dead hand" poison pill is invalid because, unlike pill upheld in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946 (Del. 1985), it would "interfere with the board's power to protect fully the corporation's (and its
shareholders') interests"); Grimes v. Donald, No. CIV.A.13358, 1995 WL 54441, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11,
1995), affd, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996) (prohibiting board from entering into arrangements that would
substantially restrict board's ability to manage the corporation); Abercrombie v. Davies, 123 A.2d 893, 899
(Del. Ch. 1956) (similar); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 328-29 (N.Y. 1936) (declaring void contract
that attempted to bar directors from exercising their business judgment).
59. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (limiting corporation's ability to declare dividends in order to
protect contracting parties).
60. See, e.g., id. § 14 1(a) (determining that business and affairs of every corporation shall be managed by
or under the direction of the board of directors); id. § 170 (dividends may be declared only out of surplus or net
profits).
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does not mean that it will do so. To reach that conclusion requires one more step.
2. In Competitive Markets, CorporationsCannot Chargefor Their Use of Shareholder
Funds
From the corporation's perspective, if shareholders have no right to withdraw their
capital and no right to demand payment for its continued use, the corporation has no
variable costs associated with continuing to use the capital provided by shareholders.
Once a firm has sold shares to the public, the funds paid for the shares belong to the firm
and it can use them freely with no further payment. In other words, the marginal cost of
continuing to use assets contributed by shareholders is zero. 6 1 In competitive product
markets, as discussed above, price tends to drop to marginal cost.
Since dividends are not a legal cost, they will not be treated as an economic cost.
Rather, so far as the firm is concerned, they are simply a gift; voluntary transfers made
out of profits, not costs incurred to earn profits. The market will prevent finns from
paying them as effectively as it would prevent making any other charitable gift or paying
any legally externalizable cost out of firm funds. 62 Firms that increase prices to fund
voluntary payments for shareholders will be outcompeted by firms that do not.
Thus, in a competitive market equilibrium, publicly traded firms with capital
contributed by shareholders should run economic losses (because economic profits treat
normal returns to capital as a corporate expense necessary to produce the product, and
they will have no returns to equity capital). Similarly, absent manipulation, they will have
no accounting or legal profits. Use of shareholder capital has no marginal cost, and
competitive markets will drive prices down to marginal cost.
Were shareholders unexpectedly able to demand payment of a dividend, in a
competitive market the net result would only be to drive the firm out of business. By
hypothesis, there is no surplus from which to pay the dividend. In order to pay one, then,
the firm must either offer below-market wages to some other input or charge abovemarket price for its product. Neither behavior is sustainable. In a competitive market a
firm that paid dividends would be a high cost producer and would fail.
D. The UnsustainablePublicEquity Market
If this were a correct description of the actual workings of our markets, stable and
competitive capital markets would be unusual and difficult to maintain. Ex post, firms
would find themselves unable to charge customers for the use of shareholder capital
61. Hansmann's description of the business corporation as a capital cooperative is, therefore, incomplete
with respect to public corporations. In Hansmann's model, a business corporation:
pays the members a fixed interest rate on their loans, set low enough so that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the firm will have net earnings after paying this interest and all other expenses. The
firm's net earnings are then distributed pro rata among its members according to the amount they
have lent, with the distributions taking place currently, as dividends, or upon liquidation.
HANSMANN, supra note 4, at 14. In the public corporation as we know it, shareholders do not have a right to
demand either dividend or liquidation. Thus, they are not "owners" or "members" in Hansmann's sense unless
they have market or political, rather than legal or contractual, power to enforce the hypothetical deal that
Hansmann postulates.
62. Compare MITCHELL, supra note 3 (describing corporations as "externalizing machines").
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unless they could escape competitive product pricing. Ex ante, in competitive product
markets, shareholders should expect to earn no return. Prospective shareholders should
63
foresee this problem and refuse to invest unless they expect monopoly pricing.
The net result should be a failure of the public equity capital market. Investors
should be willing to lend to public companies, since bondholders and other lenders are
entitled to a legally enforceable rate of return. But knowing that equity, having no legal
entitlement to a payment, will not receive any return in competitive product markets, they
should simply decline to provide equity capital.
Even in less competitive product markets, shareholders should expect no return.
Firms at competitive disequilibrium may generate economic surplus. In the long run,
standard economic theory predicts that competition will force its distribution to
consumers in the form of lower prices. In shorter terms, firms may be able to retain some
of the surplus. But nothing in the competitive account suggests that firms will give the
surplus (or even normal returns) to shareholders. Rationally maximizing firms will not
give free gifts when free riding is an option.
IV. No EXIT:

FIDUCIARY DUTY LAW'S FAILURE

Shareholders do not have a right to sue for dividends or return of their capital, but
they have an equitable right to sue for breach of fiduciary duty, which might appear
sufficient to make companies treat them as if they had a right to ongoing payments.
A. FiduciaryDuty: The Interests of the Corporation
Some cases-notably Dodge64 and Revlon 65 -purport to find an enforceable right
to returns on shares in the general fiduciary duty of care, which requires managers to
manage the firm in the interests of the corporation. 66 On its face, a duty to manage the

63. Alternatively, if investors are assumed to be rational, the existence of a public market for a company's
stock should be prima facie evidence that it has monopoly pricing power. This, of course, is not the current state
of anti-trust law.
64. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
65. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (holding that once
directors decide that the sale of the company is inevitable, their sole duty is to maximize the price to be received
by shares, disregarding other corporate participants, even in the factual situation presented, where many
shareholders were likely to have interests in corporation in other roles). Later cases have made crystal clear that,
absent a decision to sell the company, the board has no duty to maximize returns to shares in any identifiable
time frame. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). Corporate finance
theory suggests that time frame is irrelevant for shareholders (since share prices should reflect the present risk
and time discounted value of all future retums). However, from an enforcement perspective, returns that may
come at any time at all are the same as returns that may never come. Thus, directors have no enforceable duty to
maximize share returns at all. For further discussion, see infra, Parts IV.B and IV.C.
66. For the fiduciary duties of directors, see, e.g., RMBCA § 8.30(a) (stating that each member of the
board of directors shall act "in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation").
In Delaware, these duties are separated into two duties. First is the duty of loyalty, namely the director's
obligation to act "in the good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation's best interest." Guttman v.
Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003); see also, In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No.
CIV.A.15452, 2004 WL 2050138, at n.49 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2004) (holding that the "duty of loyalty . . .
imposes an affirmative obligation to protect and advance the interests of the corporation and mandates that [a
director] absolutely refrain from any conduct that would harm the corporation"). Second is the duty of care,
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firm in the corporation's best interests does not seem to offer much support for the
shareholder position. Standard doctrinal language either does not mention shareholders at
all, as in the "interests of the corporation" formula used by the RMBCA and many
Delaware cases, or mentions them in a context that makes clear that shareholder interests
and finn interests are different and potentially in opposition, as in the alternative
67
"interests of the corporation and its shareholders" formula.
Shareholder distributions facially fail these tests, if taken seriously. As we have
seen, dividends are a gratuitous expression of appreciation for past services already
rendered-that is, a gift. In the absence of a quid pro quo, gifts to shareholders are no
more in the corporation's interests than any other form of charity. At most, perhaps
dividends can be understood as a sort of vague good-will advertising meant to entice
future purchasers of future equity issues by creating a reputation for generosity. 68
However, this reputational gambit should not work. It will fail to convince rational
potential shareholders, due to the final period problem. Successful companies rarely need
or want to issue additional equity to the public markets; instead, they generally finance
expansion with retained earnings. 69 In other words, as soon as the company is capable of
being generous to its shareholders, it loses the incentive to do so. Accordingly, rational
shareholders would assume that successful companies will no longer care about future
shareholders and, therefore, will have no reputational reason to continue to pay dividends
to current ones once they are successful. But, if current dividends cannot deceive rational
shareholders into believing that the firm will provide future dividends after it no longer
needs shareholders, then the reputational justification of current dividends fails as well.
The result is that rational, self-interested corporations should decline to issue any
dividends at all.
In standard corporate finance influenced understandings, it is the job of the
corporate treasurer to find funding for the firm at the cheapest possible price, whether by
issuing stocks, bonds or other securities, bank loans or internal sources. Similarly, the
nexus of contract approach portrays shareholders as factors of production in a more or
less normal arms-length relationship with the corporation. On this view, a duty to act in
the "interests of the corporation" makes the gratuitous transfer of corporate funds to
shareholders more, not less, problematic.
The only way to generate a duty to distribute corporate returns to shareholders from
the directors' duty to act in the best interests of the corporation is to conflate shareholders
and corporation. Were corporate interests just shorthand for shareholder interests, or if
namely the requirement that "in making business decisions, directors must consider all material information
reasonably available." Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259, 264 (Del. 2000) (also noting that Delaware duty of
care is purely procedural); see also DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 8, § 145 (2001) (permitting indemnification of directors
and others who act in "good faith and in a manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the
best interests of the corporation").
67. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360-61 (Del. 1993) ("[D]irectors are charged
with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and to act in the best interests of its
shareholders.").
68. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145 (1953) (upholding charity contributions, inter alia, as
a sort of advertising).
69. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, 5th ed., supra note 28, at 366-67, tbl. 14-3 (showing that from 19811994, 60-90% of corporate investment was financed internally and most of the remainder was financed by debt
rather than equity. Indeed, in most of these years, net stock issues were negative.).
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corporations had no existence separate from their shareholders, giving corporate money
to shareholders could be seen as just moving money from one pocket to another. The fact
that courts often use the "corporation and its shareholders" formula as interchangeable
with the "best interests of the corporation" formula offers some support for the notion
that shareholder and corporate interests are the same. 70
Unfortunately, viewing the corporation as the same as its shareholders makes a mess
of the law. Separate existence is the fundamental point of incorporating. The key
characteristics of the corporation-legal personality, permanent existence, limited
liability, entity-level taxation, and centralized management-all flow from its
separateness. The corporate veil separating shareholders from corporation means that
neither is responsible for the debts of the other, neither is the agent of the other, and
neither can contract for the other. It prevents individual shareholders from holding up the
firm by threatening to withdraw capital at inopportune times or to veto new business
opportunities. 7 1 Moreover, separation is necessary to convert real, complicated human
shareholders into fictional investors, thus allowing business managers to focus on a few
simple goals instead of all the problems of collective existence. 72 In short, the rule that a
corporation is not its shareholders is what makes a corporation a firm instead of an
evanescent moment in the market on the one hand or a full, self-governing political
community on the other.
Viewing the corporation as the same as its shareholders also contradicts the leading
theories of the firm. Nexus of contract theories tend to disparage the view of lawyers and
sociologists that the corporation has an independent existence, instead reducing it
metaphorically to a mere fictional point in a web of contracts. However, even this
vanishing corporation does not collapse into its shareholders. Like the corporate finance
approach from which they descend, nexus of contracts theories assume that debt and
equity are largely interchangeable claims on firm cash flows, not fundamentally different
roles in a quasi-sovereign polity. But that means equity has no more claim to the firm
surplus than anyone else. In a capitalist system, there are no pre-legal rights to economic
rents.
The duty of care and duty of loyalty are duties to the corporation, not to its
shareholders. If fiduciary duties to the corporation require paying dividends, it will be to
the same extent that they require paying wages or fuel bills-firms must pay their factors
of production their market value in order to attract and retain them. But the surplus
created by the corporation belongs to the corporation. Giving away corporate assets
obviously is not in the interest of the corporation in any normal sense; it is hard to see
how it could be mandated by such duties. In fact, if there were anyone with standing to
bring the lawsuit, the easier claim would be the opposite one-that paying dividends is
waste, defined in Delaware as "an exchange that is so one-sided that no business person
70. For example, in Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361, the court uses the "corporation and its shareholders"
formula to gloss a quotation that uses the "best interests of the corporation" formula without any suggestion that
the two phrases might have different meanings.
71. Lynn Stout and Margaret Blair recently have reemphasized the importance of potential conflicts of
interest among shareholders. Lynn Stout & Margaret Blair, Specific Investment and Corporate Law, 7
EUROPEAN Bus. ORG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006); Lynn Stout & Margaret Blair, DirectorAccountability and
the Mediating Role of the CorporateBoard, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 431 (2001).
72. See Greenwood, supra note 37.
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of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has received adequate
' 73
consideration."
B. The Autonomous Corporation:The Business Judgment Rule
Moreover, even if the law could be read to include a fiduciary duty to run the
corporation on behalf of its shareholders, it is hard to see how a court could force a board
to create shareholder returns without taking over the business. 74 For a firm to survive, it
must create new contractual obligations, and each new obligation immediately reduces
the scope of potential shareholder claims at the same time as it opens the possibility for
future growth and profits. The essence of sound business judgment is deciding how much
to reinvest and where, which inputs to hire for the next period, and distinguishing
between surplus available for shareholders and funds that must be retained for business
needs. There can be no mechanical or objective answer to distinguishing costs from
surplus that a neutral court could impose on interested parties.
Perhaps as a result, substantive fiduciary duty doctrine is of no use at all in solving
the sunk cost of equity problem. Not only do courts decline to force boards to maximize
share returns, as a rule they do not even attempt to require boards to provide shareholders
with any returns whatsoever (at least outside of the narrow "Revlon Mode" that begins
when the board determines to sell the company).
Moreover, even if fiduciary duty doctrine were substantively helpful in avoiding the
equity sunk cost trap, it would be procedurally inadequate. Modem corporate law
provides that a corporation is managed by its board of directors. 75 In order to prevent
shareholders from shifting the locus of decision-making to courts, courts must defer to
board decisions. 76 The business judgment rule restates this fundamental principle of
corporate politics: So long as the board has exercised its business judgment in good faith,
acting in the manner it determines to be in the best interests of the corporation, courts will
77
not intervene on behalf of shareholders.
Courts, especially since the CaroleneProducts footnote 4, have largely defined their
73. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. CIV.A.15452, 2005 WL 2056651, at *111 (Del. Ch. Aug.
9, 2005) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (2000)).
74. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (defending the business judgment rule on
ground that "after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions").
75. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) ("A cardinal precept of the General Corporation
Law of the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the
corporation.").
76. See, e.g., Joy, 692 F.2d at 885-86 (stating that "courts need not bend over backwards to give special
protection to shareholders... ").
77. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, 683 A.2d 1049, 1052-53 n.4 (Del. Ch. 1996). Gagliardistated
that:
to allege that a corporation has suffered a loss as a result of a lawful transaction, within the
corporation's powers, authorized by a corporate fiduciary acting in a good faith pursuit of
corporatepurposes, does not state a claim for relief against that fiduciary no matter how foolish
the investment may appear in retrospect .... [The business judgment rule] in effect provides that
where a director is independent and disinterested, there can be no liability for corporate loss,
unless the facts are such that no person could possibly authorize such a transaction if he or she
were attempting in good faith to meet their duty.
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competence in procedural terms. 78 Corporate law is no exception. The business judgment
rule reflects the judicial view that the primary fora for addressing controversies regarding
corporate management are the boardroom, the managerial hierarchy, and the stock
markets, and that courts should generally respect the outcome of struggles among those
power structures, just as they defer to the decisions of the political branches of
government. 79 The business judgment rule, then, is best understood as a rule of
institutional competence, analogous to agency-deference rules in public law.
In effect, the business judgment rule assures that courts normally will not review
breach of duty claims. As a result, boards and managers are free to favor non-shareholder
constituencies (other than, perhaps, directors themselves) in distributing any surplus that
80
does exist.
1. The Business Judgment Rule's Division of Labor
Corporate decision-making structure, as created by state corporate law in
combination with the Federal regulatory scheme and ordinary practice, reflects a
generally sensible division of labor between managers, shareholders, directors and courts.
Managers are experts in running companies. Under ordinary principles of agency law,
they act for the company in all routine matters, make its decisions in the first instance,
and so on. Shareholders, particularly the institutional shareholders that dominate our
public stock markets, are specialists in pricing, buying and selling shares. The law
ordinarily grants them full autonomy in deciding whether to hold, buy or sell individual
shares.
The board of directors formally serves as the principal of the corporation, making
decisions where the firm itself, rather than its agents or constituents, must act directly.
However, directors are part-timers with only a limited ability to participate meaningfully
in corporate governance. In practice, their main responsibility is hiring and firing top
management. They also have a key role when managerial and shareholder competencies
conflict or overlap, specifically when either managers or shareholders wish to sell the
company or engage in certain related radical transformations, such as merger, sale of all
assets, dissolution or reincorporation. At least since the judicial approval of the poison
pill and its statutory equivalents, the combined state/federal regime has provided that
virtually all such transactions require the directors' approval, usually followed (except in
the case of a tender offer) by ratification by a majority of the shares.
Courts and the law generally allow each of the experts near complete autonomy in
their respective areas of expertise, restricting their interference to policing process and
78. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 152 n.4 (1938) (affirming New Deal rejection of
substantive due process and leaving most constitutional issues to the electoral process and legislative-executive
branches, but providing for more significant judicial review where issues of the integrity of those processes are
raised).
79. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 ("The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the
managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors under Section 14 1(a)."); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634
A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) ("The [business judgment] rule operates to preclude a court from imposing itself

unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation.").
80. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 n.64 (Del. 2000) (noting that "directors' business

'decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose') (quoting Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
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overreaching rather than substantive error.8 1 As a result, the main policing of managers
and shareholders is by the peer review mechanisms of market pricing, bureaucratic
promotion, and directorial supervision, rather than by courts. Shareholders hold or do not,
and managers manage, with little judicial supervision.
2. JudicialDeference: Time, RationalBasis Inquiry and the Business Judgment Rule
Procedural deference means that shareholders cannot look to courts to grant them a
right to corporate surplus when they fail to appropriate it without judicial intervention. To
see the degree of the Delaware courts' deference to managerial and board decisions,
82
consider the centrally important decision in Paramountv. Time, in which the issue was
the relative authority of board and shareholders in connection with decisions regarding
the sale or merger of the company.
Time upheld a decision of Time's board to restructure a planned merger in order to
eliminate a shareholder vote and preclude an alternative transaction that, by all
indications, would have been vastly more attractive to shareholders. From the standard
perspective of a fictional shareholder-a theoretical undiversified Time shareholder with
no interests or values at stake other than maximizing the present value of its Time
stockholdings-the decision is so difficult to understand that one is forced to assume that
the court was not taking that perspective at all. The sums offered by Time's suitor
Paramount were so large that Wall Street's professional money managers
overwhelmingly viewed them as greater than any reasonable estimate of returns to
holding Time stock. Were the goal of the court to protect undiversified shareholders, this
would have been a paradigmatic case for restricting managerial overreaching and
allowing shareholders to follow the norms of the market-to sell for an unexpectedly and
83
perhaps unreasonably high price.

81. See, e.g., In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (emphasizing that the business judgment
rule protects directors "so long as the court determines that the process employed was either rational or
employed in a goodfaith effort to advance corporate interests" and that "compliance with a director's duty of
care can never appropriately be judicially determined by reference to the content of the board decision that
leads to a corporate loss") (first and second emphases added). Although Aronson described the business
judgment rule in seemingly substantive terms as a "gross negligence" standard, even that case both justifies and
tests this rule by procedural considerations. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 805. Absent the autonomy considerations
discussed in the text, exempting directors from the ordinary negligence rules that apply to all other decisionmakers would raise serious problems of equal protection: in republics, unlike aristocracies, great responsibility
does not automatically produce great privilege.
82. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
83. In this instance, the stock market's prospective assessment seems to have been on the mark. Time's
subsequent history of spectacular executive compensation and its spectacularly unsuccessful merger with AOL
are hardly unimpeachable advertisements for the inevitable triumph of managerial capitalism.
However, the interests of stock investors as a whole may well be better met if merger decisions are made by
both corporate managers and financial specialists. To be sure, in any particular cash-out merger, shareholders
are exiting and thus unconcerned with the successor institution's success. Moreover, narrowly profitmaximizing shareholders would be perfectly happy to sell out to an irrational buyer (for example, one
overpaying due to winner's curse) or a rent-seeking buyer (for example, one intent on creating private value by
monopoly power) knowing that the buyer likely would destroy the firm or create social costs in excess of
private benefits. However, most shares are held by diversified portfolios, and portfolios have interests that
extend beyond the particular stock being sold. Most clearly, often the buyer will be publicly traded, so that
institutional investors will be on both sides of the transaction and have no interest in value-destroying deals.
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Instead, the Delaware courts chose to reaffirm the central principle of directorial
supremacy. Directors are primarily responsible for setting the corporate agenda and that,
as Delaware has repeatedly pointed out, includes setting the time frame in which the
corporation will meet its goals. But Time stands for a stronger position than mere judicial
reluctance to attempt to parse the difference between long and short term. Under
Delaware law, the directors control more than merely the timing and means the
corporation will use to achieve its ends. The directors set the corporate ends themselves.
Time defended its decision to eliminate a planned shareholder vote on the ground
that it sought to preserve "Time Culture," an ill-defined concept that seemed to center
around "the separation of church and state," as Time referred to its policy of separating
editorial from advertising staff. Time made no claim that "Time Culture" was necessary
or even helpful to maximizing shareholder returns. Indeed, although the court reports the
company's paeans to the contribution of "Time Culture" to a superior quality product, it
does not purport to determine whether that claim was plausible-it makes no judgment of
the quality of Time, People or Sports Illustrated, let alone of the links between
"separation of church and state" and the ultimate product.
Nor did Time claim that it was committed to "Time Culture" in all circumstances.
"Time Culture" was not written into the corporation's by-laws, let alone its articles of
incorporation, and the firm offered no assurances that it would continue to be the policy
of the successor corporation. Preservation of "Time Culture" was simply the current
board's current stated policy. The Time case, then, stands for the principle that the board
is entitled to determine both means and end, both how to pursue the corporation's
interests and even what those interests are.
Thus, business judgment review looks much like "rational basis" equal protection
review. Post-Lochner, courts largely accepted that legal reasoning's power is limited.
Legal reasoning can help determine the relationship between a given end and the means
to reach it, and can even help clarify the conflicts between differing moral and political
principles. But in the end, not legal logic but democratic politics of persuasion must set
our ultimate goals and resolve the inevitable conflicts among the infinite aspirations of
finite people. In the basic Carolene Products footnote 4 allocation of authority between
courts and legislature, the court conceded that the goals and interests of society are for the
legislature to determine. The post-Lochner courts recognized that the legitimate judicial
role is in setting procedures and mediating disputes within given moral/legal frameworks,
not in imposing controversial economic or political theories on the body politic.
Similarly, in corporate law courts largely permit boards to determine, within
extremely broad boundaries, what the corporate interests are. Just as the Constitution
"does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics," 4 so too the Delaware
Corporations Code does not enact Mr. Milton Friedman's narrow profit maximization or
Mr. Alfred Dunlap's short-term shareholder orientation. Corporate law, like
Less obviously, portfolios have an interest in maintaining the integrity of the process, since the price of future
mergers will reflect participants' estimates of the likelihood of post-merger success and those estimates, in turn,
are likely to be affected by past history. Pressing too hard for the maximum sales price in particular instances
may endanger the long-run game. Shareholders, however, should recognize that generally shareholders will free
ride rather than defend these long-term interests. That, in turn, should lead shareholders, acting only in their
own self-interest, to support disempowering shareholders in favor of less short-sighted decision-makers.
84. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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constitutional law, simply is not rich enough to provide a ready-made legal answer to the
issue of how or why to run a corporation.
But if the board can determine what its ends are, virtually any decision it makes will
be defensible. Just as classical rational basis review nearly always discovered some
legitimate legislative purpose to which even the oddest legislative act could be rationally
related, so too business judgment review will nearly always discover that board actions
rationally promote some permissible end.
3. The Poverty of Wealth Maximization: Multiple Ends Under the Business Judgment
Rule
It may not be obvious that the business judgment rule is this broad. Occasional
courts have suggested that corporate boards have only one legitimate goal: to maximize
profit for the benefit of shareholders. 85 Similarly, litigants often defend actions that on
their face appear to favor non-shareholder corporate constituencies as in the long-term
interests of shareholders. Often, of course, they are. However, sometimes the claim seems
a polite evasion. So long as the favored constituency is not the decision-makers
themselves, courts rarely blink at even implausible theories of long-term shareholder
interests. 86
Willingness to allow boards to choose goals other than shareholder value
maximization is the only rational explanation of the "just say no" cases. In Unitrin,87 for
example, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a board's defensive tactics against an offer
that was highly attractive to shareholders on the purported ground that they had to be
protected from "substantive coercion." But there was no coercion other than the high
price itself. The shareholders faced a choice between the offer and management's
assurances that future profits would justify a higher price still. That decision is precisely
the kind of calculation shareholders are in the business of making. If shareholders cannot
88
be trusted to make that calculation, it is hard to see why they should be trusted at all.
85. In addition to Dodge and Revlon, see, e.g., Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 1971)
(barring shareholder from exercising legal right on ground that he was not acting within shareholder role to

further proper corporate goal).
86. See, e.g., Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 325-26 n.66 (Del. 2000) (attempting to make

sense of Unitrin's holding that directors may 'protect' shareholders from an offer to sell the company for a high
price); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953) (upholding charitable contribution on
implausible ground that it is really self-interested); Kamin v. Am. Express, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

1976) (upholding, as in interests of shareholders, directors' intentional decision to pay unnecessary taxes in
order to make true financial condition of company less apparent to shareholders); Blair & Stout, supra note 4.
87. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
88. Here is how Vice-Chancellor Strine, struggling to understand the decision within a shareholder
centered paradigm, describes it:

On the other, the same electorate must be protected from substantive coercion because it (the
target board thinks) is unable to digest management's position on the long-term value of the

company, compare that position to the view advocated by the tender offeror, and make an
intelligent (if not risk-free) judgment about whether to support the election of a board that will
permit them to sell their shares of stock.
Chesapeake Corp., 771 A.2d at 326. The Vice-Chancellor's attempt to take seriously the notion that

shareholders may only be "protected" leads him to conclude that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence is nearly
incoherent. As he quite correctly points out, if the problem is lack of information, the solution should be more
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In short, the Delaware court was either radically foolish or somewhat disingenuous.
Permission is granted to "protect" shareholders, but in fact the permission is broader-to
define when and whether shareholders will determine the overall goal of the firm. The
easiest way to understand Unitrinis simply that the board, not outsiders, decides when or
whether shareholder return will be the goal of the firm. As we have seen, even when
boards have dared to explicitly admit that they are not acting in shareholder interests, as
in Time, the Delaware courts have not seen that as a problem. 89 Instead, the law is that
the court must defer both to the board's determination that a threat exists, as well its
decision respond in a particular manner. Additionally, such a threat may be to the
corporation's goals, and not solely to shareholder returns. 90
C. The Red Queen's Jam: The Impossibility of Timing
Fiduciary duty's inability to guarantee shareholders a return is not an artifact of
particular holdings or doctrinal language. If the courts were determined to create an
enforceable fiduciary duty to operate corporations only in shareholder interests, they
could, for example, reject Time, build up Dodge and Revlon, strengthen the lip service
they pay to the shareholder-centered goal by demanding evidence of it, or even revert to a
Lochner-esque confidence in the power of legal categories to govern complex societies. It
would not suffice. The problem is fundamental.
Since Miller and Modigliani's work half a century ago, finance theory has taught
that time frames are irrelevant from the perspective of a diversified investor. 9 1 The price
of a share of stock should be equal to the market's estimate of the current risk-adjusted,
time-discounted value of all future returns to that share (i.e., future dividends plus the
final period payment). 92 Because the share price capitalizes all predicted gains-whether
near or distant in expected date-investors should be perfectly happy with a firm that
reinvests internally with an eye to future profit rather than paying out current dividends.
information, not allowing the board to preclude shareholder decision making. Id. at 328.
89. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1140 (Del. 1989). Mark Roe's summary of
the law is thus incomplete. Roe states, correctly, that under the business judgment rule, courts police selfdealing by directors and managers, but not incompetence or mismanagement. See generally MARK J. ROE,
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2002). But he fails to note that courts do not even
view intentional failure to act in shareholder interests as mismanagement. In the absence of self-dealing, U.S.
law-in-the-courts delegates to the board decisions of balancing shareholder interests against other firm values
nearly as much as in more openly balancing regimes such as the Netherlands. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 1.
Despite its absence from the law in the books, the shareholder-centered norm is key to understanding corporate
law as it stands today. See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 37; Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good
Corporations Go Bad, 2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 773. Its normative power, however, stems from non-legal
norms, such as the metaphoric rhetoric of "ownership," "agency," or "shareholder democracy," rather than the
shareholders-iiber-alles mandates of Revlon and Dodge. These norms are reinforced by the non-trivial market
pressures. The more competitive product or supplier markets are, the less distinction there will between
maximizing shareholder value and merely surviving (at competitive equilibrium, of course, the firm must run as
fast as it can just to stay in one place-survival requires maximization). Even when product markets are more
forgiving, capital markets, even after the decline of the market for corporate control, amply reward actions they
perceive to be in the interests of shareholders.
90. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); see also Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 138889.
91. See supra note 6.
92. See, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 64; KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 2.
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Indeed, since internal reinvestment avoids a layer of income taxes, they may even prefer
the firm to defer dividends.
As a result, in a moderately efficient capital market, stock market investors should
be entirely indifferent between long and short term profits or varying dividend policies,
regardless of their own personal cash needs or time preferences. Should the company
generate cash later than they need it, they can sell shares, thereby realizing the current
discounted value of the future cash. Conversely, should the company generate cash at a
time when the investor does not need it, the investor can simply reinvest. Accordingly,
courts seeking to require corporate managers to operate the company in the interests of
shareholders rationally should respond by focusing entirely on rate of profit, not its
timing.
Inside the corporation, however, timing is everything. First movers have potential
for disequilibrium profits or to create cascade effects and lasting market domination.
Conversely, a product that takes too long to develop or that appears before its time is a
product that is likely to fail. Receivables collectible next quarter may be of limited use if
payables must be met this quarter; as Long Term Capital Management demonstrated,
being right (and solvent) in the long run is not enough. 93 No legal principle can tell a
judge when a company should focus on the next quarter and when it should focus on the
next decade.
Thus, were courts to attempt to require firms to profit maximize in some particular
time frame, they would destroy one of the key advantages of the business corporation. In
modem business corporations, shareholders do not have a right to their capital back at a
specified time or on demand. Instead, equity serves as permanent financing for the firm,
independent of market fluctuations. This predictability is94key to long-term planning and
illiquid investments that would otherwise be impractical.
Economic projects do not come in neatly packaged units with fixed end points and
many are illiquid for long periods of their expected life. Often, a project could be
destroyed if investors were permitted to withdraw mid-stream: a half-built factory, a drug
in development or a computer program that doesn't yet work may have little value to
outsiders suffering from information asymmetries. Similarly, the secondary market for
used factors of production is often problematic: buyers who have difficulty telling
whether a machine or building has been well maintained should not be willing to pay full
value for it. 95 If the company is required to pay off an individual investor at a time when
it is illiquid, it may be forced to raise additional money on unfavorable terms, sell off
assets at fire-sale prices or compromise with the departing investor.
Ex ante, foreseeing such problems, investors might be unwilling to invest if the
enterprise's success were dependent on other investors choosing not to withdraw. Thus,
individual investor rights to withdraw, either at will (as in a partnership) or at fixed times
(as in many investment pools) can preclude illiquid investing. But illiquid investing93. See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG TERM
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000).

94. One should not over-exaggerate the necessity of equity investors, however. Other highly successful
market economies function with less developed stock markets than ours, finding altemative-often bankbased-sources of long-term capital.
95. See generally George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (discussing the
uncertainty of quality and the incentives to sell poor-quality goods).
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disequilibrium, non-commodity investing-is likely to be the most dynamic and
profitable investing in the economy.
For each of these reasons, then, courts must allow firms to determine both the time
frame of their investments and the timing of payments to shareholder investors.
Unfortunately, as every procrastinator knows, something that is always better done
tomorrow-like paying dividends in a Miller and Modigliani world-is something that
need never happen today. 96 The result is the promise of fiduciary duty to make
shareholders into residual beneficiaries fails. The freedom to determine the time frame in
which to maximize shareholder returns is the freedom never to return anything at all to
shareholders. 97 As a practical matter, a corporation's board can evade any requirement
that it act in the shareholders' interests by simply declaring that it wishes to use retained
earnings for corporate purposes, such as expansion or other plans to improve long-term
profits. 98 Instead, the corporation may invest for a long term that, like the Red Queen's
jam, never arrives: "Two pence a week and jam every other day.... The rule is, jam tomorrow and jam yesterday-but never jam to-day." 99
96. Cf Manuel Utset, A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete Contracting: The Case of
ShareholderContracts,2003 UTAH L. REV. 1329 (describing procrastination problems).
97. Moreover, in the real world, the possibility of market inefficiency is omnipresent. Wall Street, after
all, could not exist if the market price were always correct-there would be no reason to research and little
cause to trade. For this reason, "the directors of a Delaware corporation have the prerogative to determine that
the market undervalues its stock and to protect its stockholders from offers that do not reflect the long-term
value of the corporation under its present management plan." Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361,
1376 (Del. 1995). Thus, not only may a board determine to pursue long-term rather than short-term value, but it
may also decide that the market's assessment of its plans is simply incorrect. These are not odd doctrinal
positions. They are necessary. A corporation exists, as Coase pointed out, because it has some advantage over
the market. Coase, supra note 37. If corporations were forced to follow the whims and will of momentary
market fluctuations, they would lose that advantage and with it their reason to exist.
98. Louis Lowenstein has made a similar point in connection with Hecla Mining, where, he contends, all
the profits from a highly successful mine were reinvested in the mine until the ore ran out-with no payments
having been made to the shareholders. Louis LOWENSTEIN, SENSE AND NONSENSE IN CORPORATE FINANCE
125 (1991) (describing repeated instances in which managers did not pass on economic profits to shareholders,
but instead used them to expand, diversify, etc). Lowenstein presents his examples as instances of managers
wasting shareholder money. Courts, he contends, simply do not (I would contend, could not) police boards that
use all economic returns to continue the business as long as possible, thus ensuring that employees, suppliers
and customers-but not shareholders-obtain the benefit of the firm's activities. But Lowenstein's
condemnation assumes that the funds, which legally belong to the corporation, "actually" belong to
shareholders. Taking corporate ownership seriously, the issue is,
rather, whether corporate managers made
proper use of the funds from the inevitably contested perspective of the corporation.
In some cases, it is hard to imagine any perspective from which managers acted successfully-running a
great department store into the ground does not seem to be in any one's interest. However, in other cases, what
looks like waste from the perspective of shares may not have been waste at all from the perspective of other
corporate participants. Hecla, for example, as Lowenstein describes it, owned a highly profitable but nonrenewable wasting asset. It chose to fully exploit the mine, taking all economic profits and reinvesting them into
the mine. While the shareholders received nothing, employees and silver consumers (if not the environment) did
quite a bit better than they might have under an alternative management plan. Contrary to Lowenstein, who sees
the managers' decisions as a simple self-interested breach of their professional duties, one could view the
managers' decision to continue mining as long as possible without paying shareholders as perfectly rational if
managers were seeking to maximize the profits (or longevity) of the corporation, or the mine itself-thought of
as an institution with a value of its own-or if they were seeking to maximize employees' continued
employment or silver consumers' low-cost silver.
99. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 53 (The Tempest
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Investing for the future, taken to its logical extreme, means never giving anything at
all to shareholders.
D. The Impossibility of FiduciaryLiability: Post-Lochnerism in CorporateLaw
It is conventional at this point to condemn courts for failing to enforce the
shareholder primacy norm. But the courts have not failed. Rather, they have appropriately
remained within their institutional constraints in declining an invitation to impose a norm
nowhere found in the applicable law and, in any event, unenforceable at any reasonable
price. Even if courts were prepared to force every corporation to adopt a uniform rule of
profit maximization notwithstanding the arguments of the previous sections, the realities
of the business world would require extreme deference.
We have no professional consensus on how profit is to be maximized. Many people
believe that profit, like happiness, is best pursued indirectly. The business schools and
business press regularly debate whether, even if one wishes to pursue profit, it is not
better done by placing some other goal foremost--customer satisfaction, a great product
or quality service. Reflecting this debate, the statutes typically are completely silent on
the subject of profit maximization.
Indeed, more broadly, the problem of enforcing fiduciary duty inheres in the basic
notions of the liberal state itself. 100 In our post-Lochner world, it is hard to imagine
courts consistently being anything but deferential to corporate boards. Normally, courts
decline to make value judgments or enter into political conflicts unless they have an
authoritative norm to which to defer. 10 1 In ordinary politics, when interests conflict,
decisions about whose interests to favor are for the legislature. Similarly, when values
conflict, courts seek an authoritative determination of the conflict outside their own
decision-making process: judges routinely view themselves as compelled by norms that
some other institution has created.
Corporate law is no different. Courts will impose norms only if they are certain that
the norm was imposed on the courts by an external authority. In corporate law, however,
the courts lack either a social consensus or a legislative mandate for imposing a limited
range of purposes on corporations. As noted above, the statutes do not merely allow
corporations to determine how best to pursue profit, including indirectly. They explicitly
authorize forming corporations for any legal purpose at all. The statutes reflect the social
reality: we have no consensus on a single, normative purpose for the corporation.
Shareholder primacy may be hegemonic today, but, every decade or two, we see a flurry
of arguments that corporations in a democracy might actually have purposes or
responsibilities beyond making their shareholders rich. 102 Corporations themselves, even
Co. 1986) (1871).
100. See generally on the problem of values in pluralist societies, ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND
POLITICS (1976); MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENTS (1996).

101.

On patterns ofjudicial deference, see Greenwood, supranote 19.

102. See, e.g., MARJORIE KELLY, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF CAPITAL: DETHRONING THE CORPORATE
ARISTOCRACY (2001); MITCHELL, supra note 3; RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE

GIANT CORPORATION (1976); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1145 (1932); Kent Greenfield, New Principlesfor CorporateLaw, I HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 87 (2005);
Cynthia Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and CorporateSocial Responsibility, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 1197 (1999).
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the most profit-oriented, assiduously advertise their other virtues and purposes to the
general public, offering at least the hypocrite's tribute of vice to virtue in acknowledging
that profit is not, after all, the ultimate end of life.
To be sure, some writers have long claimed that something in the nature of the
corporation or markets or capitalism itself mandates that corporations be run solely in the
interests of shares and that the interests of shares can be understood as a matter of logic
without deference to the views of the human shareholders themselves.' 0 3 Courts that
have accepted that claim-notably, the Dodge and Revlon courts-feel more free to
coerce boards to act in the manner they deem in the interests of these imaginary
shareholders. 104 But in the post-Lochner world, property is usually viewed as a creation
of the state without a set of inherent rules that can be divined by judges without regard to
the statute book.
As we have seen, the statute book simply does not resolve conflicts between shares
and other corporate constituencies. Instead, it creates internal corporate politics. Under
our legislation, the corporate board makes value judgments for the firm. It is the ultimate
decision-maker not only of the technical issue of how to maximize, but also of the
political issue of what or whether to maximize. Courts following the post-Lochner
paradigm are likely to be inclined to defer to legislative judgments about the extent of
property rights and the proper realm of political regulation of our mixed economy. The
same world-view will lead them to respect the legislative decision that governing the
corporation is for its board, within only the broadest of limits.
Fundamentally, in a liberal society, the interests of articulate adults generally are
contested and contestable, and therefore it is usually accepted that they cannot be set out
in the abstract without regard to the views of the interested parties themselves.
Shareholders are a diverse group-roughly half the American electorate, many
foreigners, and institutions representing those individuals in varying roles, as well as
institutional interests not readily reducible to the interests of their constituents. 105 For
courts to impose a single purpose on corporations, they would have to accept a clearly
false claim that all these people and organizations have a single interest-maximizing the
return on their stock investments at any cost to other human, social, aesthetic, political or
ecological values. This flies in the face of ordinary liberal assumptions that people have
103. For further discussion, see Greenwood, supra note 37.
104. Such courts also see no need to defer to the actual views of shareholders, which-if they differ from
the hypothetical interests defined by theorists-are merely evidence of inauthenticity or false consciousness.
One clear example is State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 1971), in which the
court decided that a shareholder who sought to urge the corporation to serve his real interests-by declining to
participate in war production on political rather than profit grounds-was not a "real" shareholder. But the view
that corporations exist only to pursue profit, regardless of the views of shareholders or other corporate
participants, is quite widespread and has influenced many areas of corporate law. See Greenwood, supra note
37.
105. University endowment funds, for example, represent a set of interests peculiarly difficult to reduce to
any individual's. See Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (1990)
(suggesting various interests endowments may serve); Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work?
ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1787 n. 115 (1990)

(suggesting that universities have some characteristics of professor cooperatives). Most faculty members and
administrators are likely to find the professor's co-op view at odds with daily experience. Generally, professors

do not vote for the board of trustees, and faculty governance ends precisely when the board, or its delegatesthe administration-disagrees.
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many ends, and many and conflicting goals, which they, not judges or economists, ought
to resolve or mediate. Courts accepting the idea that a limited government ought not
impose specified ends on its citizenry should be reluctant to impose the share-return
maximization goal on corporations or their boards. Rather, it will seem natural to protect
the autonomy of internal corporate decision-making mechanisms by deferentially
applying the business judgment rule.
In short, corporate law imposes no legal obligation to pay shareholders. While the
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, particularly if seen through the lens of Dodge, might
seem to impose an equitable obligation to work for shareholders, nearly all observers
agree that when combined with the business judgment rule, they provide little restraint on
managers. The most common explanation is Judge Winter's: courts defer to boards in
order to ensure that managers continue to take risks-that is, courts are deferring to
professional board decisions regarding the means the corporation chooses to employ to
reach its agreed-upon end. 106 1 have argued that deference is even broader-it extends to
the board's choice of ends as well, as most clearly illustrated in Time. However,
regardless of the motivation for judicial deference, the practical result is clear: in the
absence of self-dealing, courts do not police management discretion. 107
V. BEYOND THE SIMPLE

ECONOMIC MODELS: LIFTING ASSUMPTIONS

As we have seen, our legal rules should generate no dividends for shareholders in
competitive markets. Given the complete absence of any legal duty to make distributions
to shareholders and the near absence of any fiduciary or equitable duty to do so,
shareholders are sunk costs and payments to them are in effect gifts. Competitive product
markets bar producers from paying more than marginal costs and leave no funds
available for shareholders. Since this is predictable, potential shareholders should decline
to invest and the equity market should collapse into a market for lemons. But equity
financing of publicly traded companies actually exists. Accordingly, we need an
explanation of how the model differs from the real world.
A. Competitive Market Solutions-ConvertingFixed Costs to Variable Costs
One way to avoid the sunk cost problem would be to convert fixed costs into
variable costs. To see how this works, return to the physical asset example. If the widget
company rents its widget machines on a daily basis, its calculation of when to run them
and when not changes. Now it will decide to operate the machine on any given day only
if the price it expects to receive for the widgets will cover not only the cost of raw
materials and labor, but also the rental of the machine. If prices drop below that, the firm

106. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982); cf In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No.
CIV.A.15452, 2005 WL 2056651 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005) (explaining that it would not be in the interest of
shareholders for the law to create incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions).
107. See, e.g., ROE, supra note 89, at 172 (stating "one does not exaggerate much by saying that American
corporate law has produced only one major instance in which non-conflicted managers were held liable for
mismanagement: Smith v. Van Gorkum"); Edward Rock, Preaching to Managers, 17 J. CORP. L. 605, 609
(1992) ("[Lowenstein's] horror stories [of companies not managed in the interests of their shares] clearly show
the limited extent to which either market or institutional or legal mechanisms constrain management
discretion.").
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will simply close down. For this firm, marginal price (at least on time spans of more than
one day) is now equal to average price. If the entire industry were organized in this
fashion, the fixed cost problem would be solved and the market would find a competitive
equilibrium in which supply, demand, marginal cost, and average cost all converge.
10 8
If
For financial capital, the equivalent solution is to substitute debt for equity.
investors fear that they will not be paid for selling their capital to the firm, they can rent
it. The equivalent to the daily rental of machinery is short-term or callable loans. If the
firm is financed with daily renewable loans, each day the firm must decide whether to
continue to pay for funds or close down; accordingly, fees for use of capital are variable
costs and will be included in its price. Interest payments, then, are a variable cost.
Moreover, borrowing need not be short-term to solve the investor sunk cost
problem. Debtors have a legal right to be paid interest at regular intervals. Since the firm
must meet its interest obligations in order to continue to operate, it will treat interest as a
variable cost even though it does not vary with production, and it will not be tempted to
ignore the cost of debt in calculating its marginal costs. But the problem is more
complicated.
1. Preconditionsto the Rental Solution
First, the debt solution can only work under limited circumstances. If other firms
continue to finance using equity, they will have lower variable costs and be able to drive
a purely debt-financed firm out of business (before driving each other out of business as
well). Even if all firms adopt debt, firms will be tempted to defect-to switch to lower
marginal-cost ownership and below average-cost prices in the hope of achieving
economies of scale or creating a monopoly. Thus, even debt financing may not lead to a
stable equilibrium with prices at or above average cost. Instead, so long as public equity
financing is available, competitive pressures should drive companies, first, to issue
equity, and second, to lower prices to marginal costs with the result that they will earn no
fund from which to pay shareholders anything.
For the debt solution to work, the market must have some characteristic preventing
competitors from switching to equity financing. For example, if rapid technological
change means that capital equipment has a very short life-span, fixed costs basically
disappear, and lenders should be able to assume that debtor firms will not be competed
into bankruptcy.
The simplest solution is for the public equity market to fail. For example, if
investors are confident that the relevant product market is competitive, they might
conclude that no firm will be able to charge prices in excess of marginal cost, and
therefore no firm will earn a fund from which to pay dividends. If dividends will not be
paid, then equity is valueless. Equity's despair is the precondition to debt's success.
Without a public equities market offering zero marginal-cost financing, firms and
investors could solve their sunk cost problem by using debt to keep marginal costs
aligned with average costs. This scenario may bear some resemblance to the financing of
the American railroads or of the post-war Japanese and German economies: in each case,
the public capital markets provided largely debt, not equity.
108. Rental of equipment and debt financed purchase are close economic substitutes, as tax and finance
lawyers are well aware.
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2. Is it Turtles All the Way Down?

Second, it may seem that shifting to rental, even if successful, simply pushes the
sunk cost problem back one level. If railroads all rented their rails, they might not be
tempted to push prices to a level below average cost. However, the owners of the rails
would. Each rail owner would prefer to rent at any price above its marginal cost for
renting-essentially zero-rather than let the rails sit unused. Thus, rail owners will
replicate the original problem. As William James is alleged to have said, "It's turtles all
the way down." 109 The market should collapse or gyrate from boom to bust, because, ex
ante, foreseeing the sunk cost problem, no one would enter the rail business in the first
place without seeing some escape from competitive pricing.
Here, however, financial capital does not work the same way as real capital assets.
The sunk costs problem appears when the marginal cost (not including sunk costs) of
using an existing physical asset is lower than the average cost. Equity capital replicates
that problem because once an investor purchases stock from a company, the company has
the right to use those funds with no legally mandated further payments to the investor.
But financial capital in general does not replicate the sunk cost problem.
The cost of using a highly fungible asset-and money is the most fungible of all
assets-includes Coasian opportunity costs: the profits that could be made by using it in
an alternative investment. Investors can sell or rent their cash to many different
businesses, not all of which will be afflicted with the sunk cost problem. Accordingly,
lenders, who can readily shift their funds to other uses, will not be susceptible to the sunk
cost problems of renters of railroad tracks, who are stuck with tracks that have no ready
alternative use. If railroads wish to borrow, they will have to pay the going rate for
finance capital, and if loans are short term, they will have to pay it on a current basis with
no difference between ex ante and ex post calculations.
So far, then, we come to this odd conclusion. Firms selling their product in
competitive markets should treat equity capital as a sunk cost and not include it in prices,
which will be set at marginal cost. Whether or not the stock is "entitled" to the residual, it
has no reasonable expectation of actually receiving any payment at all-not only no
residual, but not even the ordinary cost of capital. Since this ex post defection is entirely
predictable ex ante, rational investors would expect to receive no compensation for their
purchase of equity in such firms and would not purchase it. In short, the public equity
market should not exist (except in monopoly sectors).
On the other hand, if finance capital is supplied in the form of debt, firms will be
forced to include its cost in their prices and therefore (assuming other firms do the same),
to recover its costs from consumers. The result should be that firms in competitive
markets are entirely debt financed. Once again, the model suggests the original puzzle:
why does equity financing exist at all?

109. John R. Ross, Constraints on Variables in Syntax iv (Sept. 1967) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
at
available
of
Technology),
Institute
Massachusetts
https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/1 721.1/15166/l/14704247.pdf (an earlier version of this sentiment appears in
2 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, ch. XXIII § 2 (1690)); cf Clifford Geertz,
Thick Description: Towards an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 29
(1973). James's published version of the story uses rocks rather than turtles. WILLIAM JAMES, THE WILL To
BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY 104 (1956).
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B. Escaping the Equity CapitalSunk Cost Trap Through Leveraged Buyouts
For a moment in the 1980s, prominent theorists declared the public corporation
dead, for reasons that partly fit this analysis."10 The world, Jensen said, belonged to
management-led leveraged buy-outs (LBOs). III In these transactions, equity is replaced
by debt. Firms borrowed money in order to buy back their stock, resulting in a firm
financed mainly with debt. The small amount of equity left generally was held in large
part by managers who had contributed little or no actual capital to the firm.
As a result of replacing equity with debt, interest payments would rise, and the
firm's legal profit would drop sharply. Reduced profit might seem bad, but the relevant
players thought otherwise. The basic notion was that the new interest payments were
simply a reclassification of the old dividend payments-a different name for the same
return to capital.
Re-labeling profits as interest had a series of advantages, not all of them explicitly
set out by Jensen. For our purposes, the most important is that debt capital is rented, not
contributed; it is an ongoing, not a sunk, cost. Since bondholders have a legal right to
returns, the marginal cost of debt is not zero, but rather the contractually mandated
interest rate (discounted by the firm's ability to renegotiate contracts in bankruptcy).
Accordingly, capital can expect to earn a normal return and the sunk cost trap problem is
solved.
Moreover, if the firm is able to generate surplus, changing dividends into interest
changes the frame in which conflict over corporate surplus takes place. A corporation that
creates surplus must allocate it in some fashion between consumers, capital, labor and
other factors of production. The change from equity to debt capitalization does not
change this fundamental reality, but it radically shifts the appearance of the conflict.
When a successful firm is financed by equity capital, its surplus is labeled profits. The
firm appears rich. It then decides whether to allocate its wealth to shareholders (in the
form of dividends) or employees (in the form of pay increases) or other corporate
constituents. The direct conflict is transparent and obvious: every penny that goes to
dividends is a penny that does not go to employee profit sharing or consumer rebates.
Employees can be expected to be highly resentful if they do not share in the surplus; it is
hard to frame a morally acceptable reason why the success of the team should go only to
one part of the players.
In contrast, the leveraged firm transforms wealth into poverty, profits into loss and
voluntary gifts to capital into unavoidable necessity. When the surplus is created, the debt
capital already has a claim on it. In a debt-financed firm, the allocation of surplus is done
ex ante, before the surplus is created; at the time when debt is issued, contracts are
negotiated and prices are set. The direct conflict between capital, consumers, and labor
over the surplus is likely to be less salient at this point. Indeed, it may be entirely
invisible. The only way for an observer to determine where the surplus is going, or even
whether there is a surplus, is to create a second set of accounting records for the firm in
which the actual contractual prices are replaced with hypothetical market prices reflecting
110. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation, 5 HARV. Bus. REV. 61 (1989)
(explaining that "[t]he publicly held corporation ... has outlived its usefulness in many sectors of the economy
and is being eclipsed").
111. Id.

2006]

The DividendPuzzle

the minimum the firm could have paid to obtain the resources it needs. Any such
calculation is likely to be highly controversial. How can we ever know what different
bargaining might have achieved?
Consider the most extreme example, where the firm seeks to allocate the entire
surplus to capital. With conventional financing, this requires simultaneously pressing
hard on labor, keeping prices high, and paying obviously high dividends out of highly
visible profits. Since the equity market is quite competitive, high dividends will result in
high stock prices. Consumers, then, see price gouging, while employees see harsh
bargaining on wages, high accounting profits, large dividends, and increasing stock
prices. Surely this is a recipe for labor unrest and political reaction. Relatively few people
112
like being squeezed to make the rich richer, recent election returns notwithstanding.
The highly leveraged firm, however, looks quite different. To allocate all surplus to
capital, this firm issues debt with large interest obligations-obligations that can only be
met if the firm is quite successful. There is no easy way for employees or other observers
to distinguish between the part of the promised interest payments that is a necessary
market payment to obtain capital and the part that is a promise to distribute future
surplus, if any, to capital. Now, even if the firm is generating the same economic surplus
as before, it will no longer show accounting profits. Instead, given ordinary variation in
business success, the firm will frequently generate accounting losses. Ex post, employees
will see a firm in crisis, insolvency a real possibility, low or no dividends, and (if the
stock remains publicly traded) highly variable stockmarket performance. Even if the
underlying economic reality continues to be that the firm creates a disequilibrium surplus,
employees are likely to see demanding pay increases from this firm as greedy and even
counterproductive-it is in no one's interest to force your employer into bankruptcy.
By the simple expedient of setting high interest rates, the firm creates a crisis in
which it can call on employees to make extra sacrifice for the team, rather than making
the less attractive claim that employees ought to accept less so that investors can profit
more. 113 Employees who might be disinclined to accept a smaller share of the corporate
pie in order to increase shareholder profits are likely to be far less obdurate in the face of
demands that they sacrifice to prevent "default" and "bankruptcy" that will result if
interest is not paid. Contributing your share towards collective survival feels good-quite
different from being squeezed to make higher profits for investors. At the same time,
eliminating legal "profit" eliminates corporate income tax obligations. Thus, reclassifying
capital investors from equity (shareholders) to debt (bondholders) reduces the sunk cost
problem and simultaneously allows transfer to capital investors of rents that formerly
112. In a capitalist market, shortages create disequilibrium profits, which induce producers to produce more
and return the market to equilibrium. Economists, therefore, frown on attempts to suppress price increases that
result from shortages. However, when the producers are corporations, nothing in the logic of capitalism requires
that the corporation turn its excess profits over to shareholders. On the contrary, ideally it would reinvest them
in expanding production, thus eliminating the underlying shortage. Moreover, if the corporation turns its excess
profits over to employees (in the form of higher wages) or to the citizenry generally (in the form of excess profit
taxes), the incentive for other producers to enter the market in order to seize some of the excess remains just as
strong. Only if, counterfactually, we imagine that public shareholders are making investment decisions would it
be important that some of the disequilibrium rents flow through to them.
113. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Team Spirit: Doing Bad Things in the Cause of Good, in THE RANGES OF
EVIL: MULTIDISCIPLINARY STUDIES INHUMAN WICKEDNESS 5-15 (William Andrew Myers ed. 2006); Blair &
Stout, supra note 4.
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went to employees and the citizenry generally (as taxes or price cuts).
Moreover, if managers hold substantial stakes in whatever equity is left, the LBO
may solve another part of the returns-to-equity puzzle. Dividends remain discretionary,
and continue to be a cost that a firm in competitive equilibrium cannot sustain. But if the
firm is able to earn economic profits-that is, to charge a price above its marginal costsnow there is some reason to think that those disequilibrium rents will go to shareholders.
When managers are shareholders, they may find that by helping shareholders they are
helping themselves. 114
Finally, bankruptcy law, unlike general corporate law, creates an enforceable
fiduciary obligation to run the company on behalf of creditors. If the firm does end up in
court-supervised reorganization, the courts are likely to assist the firm in further transfers
from labor to capital. While no firm is ever entitled to breach an employee contract in
order to pay a dividend, bankruptcy courts routinely relieve firms of their obligations to
pay employees in order to pay interest. Indeed, not only will bankruptcy courts allow
firms to reject their contractual obligations to pay for future labor, they will allow them to
renege on pension and related promises to pay for labor that employees have already
performed. It would be inconceivable for a firm to publicly state that it was reneging on
pension promises because it wished to make high dividends higher. But it is routine to do
the same thing to fulfill economically equivalent interest obligations-even if the
obligations were assumed knowing they likely could not be met without defaulting on
promises to employees.
The LBO, then, is one possible solution to the sunk cost trap. It transforms equity
into debt, changing capital from zero-marginal cost to a high marginal cost, from no legal
right to payment to high priority, from weak moral claims to strong ones. The net result
should be an increased part of the corporate pie going to capital. Had the LBO taken over
the world, we would be able to say confidently that equity capital suffers from a serious
sunk cost problem precisely analogous to that of the railroads. However, we do see
companies that are able to sell equity, so there must be other ways out of the sunk cost
pricing trap.
C. Market Irrationality
Another possibility is that stock investors are not rational. Perhaps, Charlie Brownlike, they continually expect that this time will be different and are doomed to

114. If managers are not the only shareholders, however, we still need some explanation why managers
would choose to share firm rents with other shareholders rather than simply increasing their salaries to absorb
the excess. Of course, managers have increased their pay to astonishing levels. However, I think it clear that the
LBO movement recognized a genuine political truth-while money may be fungible, salary and dividends are
quite different. High pay is inherently more offensive than high returns to capital. High salary at a certain point
invites questioning about whether anyone's efforts could be worth that much more than the rest of us. In
contrast, returns to capital do not imply anything about the moral qualities or hard work of the recipient relative
to others. Consequently, there is something necessarily unseemly about someone receiving pay hundreds of
times higher than fellow workers, but there is nothing odd about an owner receiving profits. When Michael
Milken chose to tie his salary to the profits of the company he built, he became the highest paid employee in the
country and a national scandal. In contrast, when Ross Perot or Bill Gates chose relatively small salaries
accompanied by ownership interests, they not only appropriated more of their firms' wealth, they also became
heroes.

2006]

The Dividend Puzzle

disappointment. For example, investors may routinely expect companies to overcome the
fixed cost problem through monopoly power. A certain number of companies will, of
course, achieve pricing power for some period of time, leading to spectacular economic
profits. Cognitive errors, such as the greater salience of success over failure or dramatic
115
over routine results, might lead investors to miscalculate the actual odds of success.
The possibility that the equity market exists only because of irrationality should not
be dismissed outright. Even devotees of rational market theories acknowledge that certain
aspects of market pricing seem irrational. Perhaps the best known problem is the initial
public offering of closed-end funds.
1. The IPO Puzzle
Closed-end mutual funds consisting of a package of publicly traded stock routinely
trade in the secondary market at a discount to the value of the underlying assets taken
separately (net asset value). 116 In contrast, initial public offerings of such funds are
always sold at a premium to the net asset value, because that premium is how the
promoters are paid. It would seem to be somewhat irrational to pay a premium for a
package that one could construct for oneself for minimal cost, and entirely irrational to
pay that premium knowing that odds are high that the package itself will soon be
available at a discount. Why pay a mark-up today when you know the product will be on
sale next week? Often the market is rational and no new closed-end funds are issued. But
closed-end funds exist, which must mean that, sometimes, irrational investors are
available to purchase them in IPOs.
Investing in the initial public offering of an ordinary corporation is almost as hard to
understand. To be sure, ordinary corporations are less transparent, so it is harder to tell
that IPO investors are routinely overpaying. Still, there are several bases for thinking the
closed-end mutual fund story is generalizable. First, strong statistical evidence suggests
that IPOs, as a group, lose money for their initial investors, especially over the medium
term. That is, if you have determined that you wish to own stock of a company that is
going public, you are generally better off waiting until after the IPO and the initial price
pop that promoters attempt to create have passed.
This statistical result is theoretically sensible. The decision to offer stock to the
public is made by insiders in the company who normally are, or represent, both
incumbent management and the pre-IPO shareholders. It is hard to understand why those
insiders would choose to sell their control and/or stock unless they thought they were
getting a good price. 117 But a good price for the insiders is a bad price for IPO
purchasers. Accordingly, an investor buying stock in an IPO is, in effect, betting that the
insiders are wrong. This, in turn, seems to suggest that the investor has concluded that the
insiders are either incompetent or uninformed relative to the investor. In either case, it is
surely irrational to give them money to invest.

115. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in CHOICES, VALUES
1 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
116. See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices
as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 891, 897-901 (1988).
117. Even if insiders needed cash, if they were confident that the company and/or stock price was likely to
rise, they would borrow rather than sell equity.
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Alternatively, the investor may have concluded that whether or not the IPO is priced
correctly, other outside investors will be willing to overpay even more. Oddly, this might
even be correct-leading to a situation in which even rational investors may be willing to
sell their capital to the company (by purchasing stock) at prices that cannot be rationally
defended. I'd happily buy your worthless paper for $5 if I'm quite confident that
someone else will quickly buy it from me for $10. 118
2. A Sucker a Minute Keeps the Market Healthy, Wealthy and Wise
Accordingly, one depressing explanation for why the stock market exists might be
straight P.T. Barnum: a sucker is born every minute. On this view, the sunk cost model
correctly describes the analysis of rational investors in a market of rational investors. But
if there are enough irrational investors who do not understand that they have no
reasonable expectation of the company paying for the money they give it, the market can
continue. Rational investors will buy in the expectation of selling to irrational investors,
who will expect, baselessly, to share in economic profits the company is unlikely ever to
make. Occasional firms will defy the odds, thus confirming the irrational investors in
their biased preconceptions. More often, the stock will be merrily sold back and forth in
the secondary market without any rational basis until, in the end, some sucker ends up
holding it when it becomes apparent to all that it is worthless.
But all this is unsatisfying. Many publicly traded companies do appear to earn
economic profits and do pay dividends. Retrospective investigations of stock prices
generally can rationally justify them using expectations of future dividends that, even if
often overly optimistic, do not seem to be wildly different from the actual event. Even if
the financial markets as we know them are heavily dependent on irrationality, it seems
hard to believe that irrationality is the whole explanation.
D. The Power of the "Marketfor CorporateControl"
Rather than a legal right to the surplus, perhaps shareholders just have the raw
power to take it. The shareholders' relationship to the corporation is basically political.
They are not owners, contracting parties, trust beneficiaries or principals, despite the
widespread popularity of such metaphors among ideological defenders of the investor
role. 11 9 Owners, of course, do not have to offer justifications for why they should be

118. On rational arbitrage creating even more irrational pricing, see, for example, ROBERT J.

SHILLER,

IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 44-68 (2000).

119. For preliminary discussions of the metaphors of corporate law, see Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Markets &
Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law, 74 UMKC L. REv. 41 (2005); supra Part I; Greenwood,
Enronitis,supra note 89; supra Parts IV.A, IV.B.3; Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Introduction to the Metaphors of
CorporateLaw, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 273 (2005). The claim that public shareholders are "owners" of the
corporation, even though they lack the normal attributes of ownership, is deeply embedded in business culture.
Brealey, for example, states that "a corporation is owned by its common shareholders." BREALEY ET AL., supra
note 2, at 366. They explain this claim by stating that in a corporation with no debt and a single shareholder
who is also the CEO, the shareholder would have "complete cash-flow" and "complete control" rights. The
former is clearly incorrect if the corporation has other contracting parties, such as employees or suppliers. In
any event, close shareholders have the ability to defeat the separate existence of the corporation that public
shareholders lack. Brealey deals with this problem by the bare assertion that the shareholders of a public
corporation have the same "ultimate" rights as a single shareholder. Id. at 368. This claim appears to ignore the
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entitled to take any surplus associated with their property. Owners just take it as an aspect
of their general rights to control the property. If someone prevents them from doing so,
they can invoke the judicial process and police to deliver it to them. Shareholders, unlike
owners, have no legal right to control the corporation and specifically no right to demand
that the corporation turn over corporate property-whether surplus or not-to them.
Similarly, shareholders lack enforceable contractual rights; lack the legal protections of
trust beneficiaries; and, quite unlike principals in an agency relationship, they have no
right to direct or terminate directors, and directors are not bound by their actions.
Instead, the shareholders are electors. Shares have the right to vote for the directors
who do have legal rights of control over the firm. Unlike shareholders, the board of
directors is entitled to control over the corporation's property (although only for
appropriate purposes: the directors are not owners either).
Perhaps the political rights of shares create indirect control sufficient to ensure that
shareholders will receive the surplus. This in turn would suggest that we should see them
as simple rent-seekers in the mode of standard public choice models, using their power in
the (corporate) political process to obtain benefits (by corporate administrative decree)
that they could not win under standard competitive market conditions. Clearly, the shares
sometimes do have the ability to force the corporation to distribute its assets to them.
1. Corporationswith a Single Shareholder:Quasi-ownership,PoliticalControl
Consider the simplest case, a corporation with only a single shareholder. A single
shareholder has almost the standard bundle of ownership rights with respect to the
corporation. Corporate law insists that the corporation remain separate from the
shareholder. Still, so long as the shareholder works within the formal procedures of
corporate law, it is largely free to determine whether assets remain in the firm or exit it
and to whom. 120 While the law places the directors in formal control of the firm, with the
associated fiduciary duties of independent judgment, loyalty and care, a sole shareholder
controls their tenure and can readily replace any director whose independent judgment
fails to match that of the shareholders'. Moreover, only shareholders have standing to
enforce the fiduciary duties, so those duties do not limit a sole shareholder. Accordingly,
the sole shareholder has indirect but effective control of the decision-making apparatus of
the firm. In the medium run, the shareholder's will determines what will happen, not
board judgments about shareholder interests or legal doctrines of due care, loyalty or
corporate purpose. With a single shareholder, the corporation's separate existence
becomes a legal fiction and the shareholder, formally merely an elector, is almost a real
owner.
Here, if the firm has market power to create a producer's surplus, the surplus is
(almost) the shareholder's. It will go to other firm participants only if the shareholder

realities of fiduciary law and board autonomy.
120. Corporate law limits are not entirely procedural. The Fraudulent Conveyance Acts and dividend
restrictions will limit the ability of single shareholders of corporations near insolvency to remove corporate
assets. See, e.g., RMBCA § 6.40(c) (restricting dividends when corporation is insolvent). However, corporate
law is so flexible that a single shareholder can effectively plan around these restrictions in most instances. See
generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996) (detailing methods of rendering
firms judgment proof while continuing business as usual).
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decides to give it to them. We do not need any account of the "right" of the shareholder
or the "purpose" of the firm to reach this result. As a matter of law, that surplus belongs
to the firm, and the shareholder decides what the firm will do with it. Presumably, selfinterested shareholders will take it for themselves. 121
Of course, political right is not market power. If other firm participants have
sufficient market power, they are likely to demand and receive part or all of the returns to
cooperation reflected in a producer's surplus. If other firms imitate the efficiencies of this
one, the surplus will go to consumers, as prices are bid down to costs. If other producers
do not appear, but factors in this firm are able to make themselves expensive to replaceskilled employees, for example-those factors will charge the firm more, and the surplus
will go to them. It is a question of relative market power whether the gains created by
cooperation will become firm residual available for the shareholder.
The shareholder's political control, in short, gives it power over the residual, not the
surplus. But that entitlement is somewhat tautologous. The residual is simply whatever is
left in the corporation at the end of a struggle with everyone else over the surplus to
cooperation. If the entire surplus goes to some other corporate participant, the shareholder
may be disappointed, but has no cause to complain of unfairness or illegitimacy. In a
capitalist system, no one has a right to rents--only a right to struggle with other rent
seekers over them until, hopefully, competition eliminates them entirely.
2. Closely Held Corporations
Even when a single shareholder (or a small group of shareholders legally permitted
to coordinate) controls only a majority of the shares, that control is enough to give the
shareholder significant power. When a single shareholder controls a majority of the stock
and its associated votes, the distinction between shareholder role and director role
becomes less important. At that point, the shareholder has the legal right to elect the
board of directors and therefore can control their decisions within the broad constraints of
the business judgment rule.
To be sure, such a majority shareholder still does not have all the rights of
ownership. Courts continue to insist that directors exercise independent judgment and, in
particular, that they not unduly favor the interests of the majority shareholder over the
(imagined) interests of other shares. But, in practice, judicial supervision may be limited
enough that the power of a controlling shareholder is close to that of a sole shareholder,
particularly in conflicts with non-shareholders.
3. Public Corporations:The Right to Go Private
Shareholders in a public corporation have one important source of power that we
have not discussed: the ability to sell to a single shareholder who will take the company
private. More precisely, the entire stock market has this power because it is the entire
stock market that determines stock price.1 22 If the investment community decides that a
company is not being run in the interests of shareholders (or sufficiently in their interest),

121. In order to avoid corporate income tax, generally sole shareholders will pay themselves in some other,
deductible, role.

122. For a fuller discussion, see Greenwood, supra note 37.
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potential purchasers will lower the amount they are willing to pay for its stock, and
potential sellers will only be able to sell at a reduced price. The stock price drops.
Critically, this price drop is not an action of the existing shareholders, but of the
market as a whole. If the stock price drops enough, competitors or investors will see a
profit opportunity: if they can purchase all the stock, they will be able to use the quasiownership rights of a single shareholder to change the distribution of the company's
economic profits.
a. The BriefHeyday of Stock Market Control
For a brief moment in the 1980s, this was the end of the story. Once an opportunity
was spotted, someone seized it, and the company was forced to change. The stock market
always won. 123 When a tempting target presented itself-often a conglomerate or heavily
unionized company that obviously was generating surplus and distributing it to
constituents other than the shareholders-junk bond-financed financial operators or
strategic investors smelling a bargain would launch a tender offer, sometimes in
combination with a proxy contest, to replace the incumbent board. Often, the tender price
could be dramatically higher than the current market price of publicly traded stock,
precisely because the offeror's valuation would reflect the greater power of a single
shareholder while the public price reflected the reality that public shareholders have no
1 24
power to force managers to distribute surplus to shareholders.
If the offer price was higher than the market's estimate of the value of the
company's public stock under existing policies, the stock price usually rose immediately
to match, as pessimistic or backwards-looking shareholders sold to professional
arbitrageurs whose profits depended on a quick sale of the company. The new
shareholders, in turn, would quickly sell into a tender offer, and control of the company
would move to a single shareholder. Sometimes, particularly in the early 1980s, potential
buyers could make success even more likely by structuring the offer to provide a
prisoner's dilemma, in which shareholders would be tempted to race to tender even at
unattractive prices lest others tender first and leave them holding an even less attractive
package. In any event, after a successful tender offer, the buyer then ended up with all the
stock, and could appropriate the firm's surplus as a quasi-owner of a closely held
corporation.
In the world of the ever-present hostile takeover threat, the stock market had real
power. Managers quickly learned that running the company as the stock market preferred
was their only choice; anything else threatened removal through hostile tender offers.
Managers who remained loyal to their subordinates in middle management and the blue
collar ranks quickly became an endangered species.
The pain of managerial disempowerment was lessened once it became clear that the
stock market was happy to see managers take unprecedentedly large shares of the
corporate surplus for themselves, so long as they did it in a way that appeared to tie their
interests to those of shareholders. Managers, thus, faced a strange choice. They could
123. The literature on the active market for corporate control of the 1980s is enormous. A good starting
point might be John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 1 (1986).
124. See, e.g., Kraakman, supra note 116.
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maintain their old loyalties and ways of operation and risk being displaced by someone
who would violate the implicit agreements and norms of the prior era. 125 Alternatively,
they could do the betrayals themselves and assuage their guilt with a large chunk of the
wealth transferred from other corporate participants.
In the middle 1980s, defensive advisors often had to pull their clients into this brave
new world kicking and screaming. For many, when loyalty and professional ethics
conflicted with economic self-interest, the choice was not clear. By the 1990s, the culture
of America's board rooms had changed to the point where this Faustian bargain no longer
seemed clearly immoral. The new generation of CEOs celebrated market norms of selfinterest, gave themselves enough stock or options to become shareholders on a level not
seen since the company founders of the Gilded Age, and made profit and high stock price
key corporate goals. The stock market applauded. From the market's perspective, it was
better to pay CEOs than run of the mill employees. It seemed impossible that one CEO,
even if overpaid beyond imagination, could take as much of the corporate surplus as the
entire workforce. 126 Similarly, shareholding managers, the market correctly understood,
would be far more likely to see returns to shares as a key corporate purpose. Moreover, as
CEOs moved out of the professional classes into the ranks of the super-rich, they could
be expected to find the share-centered view of the world increasingly consonant with
their daily lives: the new plutocrats have more in common with the rentier class than the
subordinates with whom they work every day. Unsurprisingly, however, even as the new
CEOs accepted the profits of their new alliance with the stock market, they proved no
more loyal to shareholders than they had to their co-workers.
b. Return to Normalcy: The Poison Pilland the New Politicsof CorporateControl
The stock market's power was quickly quashed. It turned out that a robust take-over
market had few supporters outside of the corporate-law academy. By the early 1990s, the
courts and legislatures had assiduously approved new rules that shifted power back to
corporate boards. Most important, the poison pill and its statutory equivalents effectively
bar the stock market from transferring control to a single shareholder without the consent
of the board. 127 Virtually every publicly traded corporation has taken advantage of these
developments to eliminate the anomalous right of shareholder initiative that made the
hostile takeover possible. Today, the shareholders have no more legal power to sell the
125. See Coffee, supra note 123 (discussing how the stock market regulated actions of managers).
126. Whereas median salaries and productivity rose in lockstep from the Depression through the early
1980s, after the shareholder revolution the two became unstuck. In the last several decades essentially all
productivity gains have gone only to the top 10% of income earners, and the vast bulk has gone to the very top
of that group. See, e.g., Ian Dew-Becker & Robert Gordon, Where Did the Productivity Growth Go? Inflation
Dynamics and the Distribution of Income, in 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 67-127 (William

C. Brainard & George L. Perry, eds. 2006) (median income was virtually unchanged 1996-2001, while the share
of the top. 1% increased by almost 300%; income growth rates over 35 years were 0.3% per year at the median
and 3.4% at the top 0.1%).
127. A poison pill drastically dilutes the holdings of any offeror who proceeds without board permission.
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (describing and upholding pill). Parallel
statutory provisions bar "interested shareholders" from merging with the company for prohibitively long
periods if they acquire controlling positions without prior board consent. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203
(2006) (barring interested shareholders from merging for three years absent prior board consent or
supermajority share approval at a shareholder's meeting).
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company to a single shareholder than they have to act for the corporation in any other
way. To buy a publicly traded corporation and take it private, you must obtain board
approval. Moreover, the courts, as we saw in the Time case, are reluctant to force boards
to endorse particular transactions, so, in the end, the question is whether the market can
persuade the board to see things its way.
Interestingly, boards continue to approve uninvited takeover attempts. Rarely,
however, is it fair to say that boards are forced to do so. Shareholders simply lack the
power to force boards to do their bidding. Since only shares vote in the corporation,
shareholders have a certain advantage in political struggles to dominate the board. But the
power of the vote is limited, since incumbent boards normally select the candidates in
elections that, in turn, normally are uncontested. Even when elections are contested, the
incumbents have enormous advantages, including the right to use corporate resources to
defend their positions. Corporate elections more often look like elections in Saddam
Hussein's Iraq, with dissidence apparently absent, than like the hard-fought conflicts of
real democracy or the sharply divided "Red-Blue" contests of the rest of American
society. 128
Moreover, shareholders have no right to instruct the board. They must, instead, elect
directors who independently conclude that the company should be sold. But shareholders
have no right to replace board members except at the end of their term and at a
shareholders meeting. 129 Generally, shareholders, even an overwhelming majority, have
no right to call a special meeting, and regularly scheduled meetings occur only once a
year. 130 Moreover, many firms have staggered boards, where each director has a three
year term and only one-third of the board is elected each year. 131 As a result, as a matter
of raw power, even a board with no shareholder support can usually hang on for quite a
while.
Potential buyers, in contrast, usually cannot keep their offers open indefinitely.
Financial buyers (planning not to run the company but simply to buy it at a price
reflecting the current shareholder-unfriendly policies, change those policies to give more
of the surplus to shareholders, and then return the company to the public markets at a
higher valuation or sell it to a strategic investor) operate in the financial markets and are
therefore painfully aware of the time value of money. Whether financial buyers are
operating on borrowed money and therefore running up interest costs, or with equity and
therefore suffering opportunity costs as their funds remain un-invested, they typically
cannot simply hang around waiting for directors to be replaced. Strategic buyers are no
128. 1 have discussed the reasons for this near unanimity and its implications for the metaphor of "corporate
democracy" in Greenwood, supra note 37. For further discussion of the mechanisms of political democracy in
corporate and non-corporate contexts, see Greenwood, supra note 19 (discussing the varieties of political
decision-making); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Akhnai, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 309 (discussing paradoxes of majority
rule).
129. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2006) (providing that directors serve until successor is qualified);
§ 141(k) (providing that majority of share votes may remove a director, except that corporations may, by
adopting classified board or cumulative voting, prevent removal of director without cause before the end of his
term); § 211 (b) (providing that election of board of directors is at the annual shareholders meeting).
130. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (authorizing directors to call special meeting and allowing
corporation to bar shareholders from doing so). Delaware law permits corporations to bar shareholders from
electing directors by written consent in lieu of a meeting. Id. § 211 (b).
131. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (b), (d) (authorizing staggered board).
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more likely to wait extended periods. They have businesses to run. In consolidating
industries, alternative deals may disappear; businesses feel pressure to either get the deal
done or move on to another one. Defensive strategists know, therefore, that a board that is
willing to fight with all the tools available to it generally can delay a potential transaction
until it dies.
The market for corporate control, in short, is no longer an adequate explanation for
why shareholders should receive any of the corporate surplus. With the demise of tender
offers that can be consummated without board approval, the stock market lacks a legal
means to impose its will on directors and managers. Under current law and practice,
shareholders have no legal right to sell to a single shareholder. The potential buyer must
follow the stringent requirements of the federal regulatory scheme in order to make a
tender offer. Incumbent managers and directors, should they oppose the plan, are entitled
to use company resources to resist it in every legal fashion. Most importantly, if the
company has a poison pill in place, as most do, a potential buyer usually will find the
transaction financially impossible unless the board allows it to go forward by voting to
redeem the pill.
4. The Limits ofPower
In the end, both the political and the market power of public shareholders are quite
limited. Any given shareholder is purely fungible, readily replaceable by another money
source. Even collectively, the entire stock market has only the power to drive the stock
price down. Low stock prices may be unattractive to managers in their personal capacity
if they hold stock or stock options themselves. High stock prices, in contrast, provide the
company a ready currency with which to purchase other companies, which may be
attractive to managers both as professionals and as status or power-seeking individuals.
But these carrots and sticks have their limits; directors or managers with values or goals
other than stock price maximization should be able to resist them.
Most politics is by informal persuasion, in the shadow of the power of the electorate,
donors, masses, violence, organization, guns or wealth. In public corporations, shares
have votes, but shareholders lack the other sources of political power. They are
anonymous, transient, unorganized and fungible. As we have seen, generally they cannot
call on the power of the state or the market to support them.
Beyond the thin shadow of their limited power, the shareholders lack full
mechanisms of informal persuasion. They have only the weakest of connections with the
actual sociological entity of the firm. The human beings who act for the firm-the
employees-have actual relationships with each other, but not with shareholders. In most
cases, directors are likely to respond to each other and especially to top managementthe people they actually talk to on a daily basis. The power of real, human, shareholders
(or, more often, human representatives of institutional shareholders) to influence this
conversation is relatively limited.
E. Cynics and Ideologues: Self-Interested Managersand The Metaphors of Corporate
Law
Why then do companies pay dividends to their shareholders, buy back their stock, or
otherwise distribute any of their economic profits to shareholders? As we have seen,
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neither economics, legal rights nor raw power provides the answer. Public shareholders
are not owners who can simply take surplus and depend on the power of the state to stand
behind them if anyone tries to stop them, nor do they have market power or political
power sufficient to force the company to give the surplus to them.
1. Atavistic Irrationality
Only a few explanations are left. Perhaps the boards are irrationally unaware of their
power. The hostile takeovers of the 1980s were a traumatic experience; perhaps boards
are still afraid of a repeat even though the law no longer allows it. This would be
surprising, however, since boards are typically well advised and the power of the
defensive tactics is no secret.
2. Tag-along Behind Powerful Managers
More likely, boards are responding to the very real power of top management, and
top management has concluded that paying dividends and otherwise acting to keep stock
prices high is in its own interest (as opposed to the corporation's). Cynically, simplistic,
unprofessional, and uninteresting as this explanation is, it must be a major part of the
truth. The great revolution of the 1980s ended with top managers holding a major part of
the stock of our major public corporations. Since then, we have discovered the obviousthat managers who are invited to pursue their own self-interest will do so, and that selfinterest will often drive them in directions that are not in the interests of shareholders or
any other corporate participant. 132 Still, when a manager holds millions of dollars of
.stock or stock options, he is likely to find the claims of stock to a share of the corporate
pie more persuasive, and the claims of ordinary employees (now so much poorer as to be
in almost a different world) less so.
The great secret of the great manager/shareholder conflict at the heart of corporate
law is that, conflicts notwithstanding, managers and shareholders have united to shift the
corporate surplus from all the other corporate participants. Only then do the arguments
over the spoil begin. The basic protection shareholders have today is the principle that all
shares must be treated equally when a dividend is declared and the assumption that
stockholding managers will, in the end, want to issue dividends, both to extract larger
sums from the corporation than they feel they can award themselves in salary and to
maintain the value of their own stock or options. 133 That said, when managers determine
that their interests are no longer aligned with the other shareholders, there is not a lot the
outside shareholders can do about it. 134
To the extent, then, that shareholder returns depend on power, the power in question
is managerial power. As long as managers do not discover a way to compensate
132. See, e.g., Greenwood, Enronitis, supra note 89, at 800-01 (discussing reasons why managers might
defect from their fundamental alliance with shareholders).
133. In an earlier era, shareholders would have relied principally on the sense of integrity and
professionalism of managers, combined with normative expectations regarding appropriate dividend policy.
However, the general acceptance of Miller & Modigliani's irrelevance hypothesis destabilized expectations
regarding appropriate dividends. Concurrently, two decades of "incentivizing" have taught managers that they
are expected to act as rational maximizers rather than selfless agents. See, e.g., Greenwood, supranote 113.
134.

Id.
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themselves without compensating shareholders as well, shareholders will continue to
receive returns.
Shareholders, then, are not entitled to the residual. They do not have the legal right
to take it. They do not create it. They do not have market power to demand it. They just
have had the good fortune to receive part of it as a side-effect of managerial selfenrichment. Presumably, this is a short-term game. Sooner or later top managers, now
extraordinarily wealthy as well as positionally powerful, will figure out a more efficient
way to distribute corporate surplus to themselves without leaving so much of it for purely
135
fungible providers of a sunk cost.
3. The Power of Words
The last explanation is ideology. If directors are persuaded that shareholders ought
to be treated as if they were owners, trust beneficiaries, principals or contractual insurers
with an inexplicably favorable deal, they may conclude that shareholders' claim to the
surplus is just and right. The metaphors of ownership, agency, trust, contract and property
rights are pervasive in corporate law discourse and management training alike. 136 These
metaphors not only hide the market reality that equity capital would have difficulty
commanding any return at all in anything resembling a free, competitive market, but are
themselves a major source of shareholder power. Ironically, the central pillar of the
shareholder value maximization principle is its demand that directors act not as selfinterested, amoral, rational maximizers but according to the normative demands of...
the maximizers themselves.
a. The Problem of Managers as Fiduciaries
The rule is clear that directors and CEOs are fiduciaries, not owners. They run the
company, but they must do so as professionals, in the interests of their client, not for their
own benefit. In this respect, they are like elected officials and civil servants, who also run
135. As one would expect, we have seen a number of instances in which CEOs have paid themselves vast
sums while the shareholders received little. These include assorted scandals-Enron, Tyco, WorldCom,
Sunbeam, Adelphia, the New York Stock Exchange-as well as other less well publicized instances. See, e.g.,
CEO Compensation, FORBES.COM, Apr. 20, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/2006/04/17/06ceo_ceocompensationland.html (the link "Worst Performing CEOs" lists examples of CEOs who received payments of
millions of dollars while their stock trailed the market). One recent study models CEO compensation as a
function of stock prices. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much? (MIT
Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 06-13, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=901826. If that is
correct, we should regularly see additional examples of blatant CEO seizure of the surplus. Stock prices reflect
(at best) expectations about future distributions of corporate surplus, while CEO salaries are largely current.
Accordingly, every time the stock market, for whatever reason, is overly optimistic, CEOs paid relative to
market valuation will have an opportunity to appropriate an extraordinary share of the company surplus. As
companies correct for the accounting fiction that stock options are free to firms and their shareholders, we are
likely to see more instances where it becomes retrospectively clear that in fact the entire corporate surplus went
to the CEO and accounting profits suggesting shareholder returns were illusory. See, e.g., Now for Plan B:
Expensing Share Options, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 15, 2003, at 62 (reporting that proposed change would reduce
reported profits at tech companies by 70%); The Right Option, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 10, 2004, at 63 (reporting
that accounting for stock options would have reduced 2002 S&P 500 profits by 19% and Apple would have
reported a loss instead of profit).
136. See supra note 119.
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large institutions for the benefit of the general public without "owning" them. More
importantly, they are like all other employees in our system. Ordinary agency law gives
employees no ownership rights in the products they create or the positions they hold,
while demanding that they set aside their own interests in order to promote the interests
of their employer. 137 A director or CEO who operates the company in his own private
interest is as clearly corrupt as a governmental official who diverts public assets to
become privately wealthy or a professional who misuses client trust for personal gain.
But the client of the directors and the CEO is the firm itself, and that creates room
for creative ambiguity. If it is clear that the board may not enrich itself at the
corporation's expense, 138 it is far less clear what it means to work for "the corporation."
Thus, directors and CEOs alike need a theory to explain what they are supposed to be
doing when they act for the corporation. Moreover, as long as CEOs accept that they do
not own the corporation, they need to justify distributing corporate assets to themselves.
For the last generation, the easiest justification has been that high CEO salaries are good
for the shareholders because they align incentives.
Occasionally, CEOs, trapped in the metaphor of a corporation as a thing with an
owner, have concluded that the shareholders' lack of ownership means that the CEO is
the owner. The same authority of the board to operate the company under the protection
of the business judgment rule with minimal input from shareholders that proves that
shareholders do not own the company, means that CEOs, who typically do have
significant power over the board, have most of the legal rights of control and use that
ordinarily are associated with ownership. CEOs who succumb to this illusion, however,
are likely to end badly. CEOs are no more owners of the firms they run than mayors are
owners of their cities, or presidents of the country.
The same culture that celebrates highly paid CEOs is delighted to take down corrupt
ones. Even the imperial CEO must remember that he is merely an officer of the
corporation, not its owner; million dollar salaries are fine, but using corporate funds to
pay for personal shower curtains is not. Smart CEOs, then, remain in their role as agents
of the firm, not its principal. Acknowledging that their power comes from office rather
than ownership, they must find a way to justify their actions as in the interests of the firm.
b. The Benefits of Share-centerednessto CEOs
CEOs have found that rhetorically reducing the corporation and its interests to the
shares and their interests justifies corporate decisions to squeeze (lesser) employees, on

137. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (setting out duty of loyalty).

138. The duty of loyalty clearly bars corporate fiduciaries from promoting their own interests at the expense
of the corporation's. Corporate law's duty of loyalty is, however, quite a bit weaker than the equivalent duties in
trust law or governmental civil service norms: nepotism, conflicts of interest, and even what Boss Tweed
defended as "clean graft" are typically permitted in the corporate sector, at least with adequate disclosure and
approval by disinterested parties. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) (allowing corporation
to hire CEO's spouse so long as the transaction was fair to the corporation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (2006)
(regulating ratification of interested transactions). This rule is often defended as an appropriate response to
information problems (insiders may be willing to provide better terms than could be had in arms length
transactions and apparently corrupt transactions may have benefits that are not obvious to outsiders). Still, the
information problems are identical in the public sector and, indeed, seem more likely to be correlated to scale
than business form, so this explanation is not altogether satisfactory.
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the ground that increasing profit at the expense of wages is in the interest of the shares, at
the same time as it justifies granting a large part of the surplus to top management, on the
grounds that top managers, unlike other employees, must be enticed rather than coerced
into doing their best, and that high, stock-based, pay will tie their interests to those of the
shares.
Moreover, the rhetoric of share-centeredness conceals one of the key problems with
the increasing pay of CEOs. Most companies require a degree of employee loyalty to
survive and prosper. Employee loyalty, in turn, is best encouraged by appealing to team
spirit--convincing the employees that the company's interest is their interest. But the
rapidly increasing income and status gaps between CEOs, as team captains, and their
employees, as team players, is obviously destructive of esprit de corps. No one likes to be
a sucker, and when one player gets all the prizes, the others are likely to begin to feel that
the game is fixed. A certain degree of egalitarianism is essential to create the sense that
"we are all in this together" that is, in turn, nearly always the most effective way to
induce employees to work. For these reasons, any credible organizational theory will
have difficulty justifying vast gaps between leaders and led as a sound way to run an
organization. The opposite is more nearly the case: ordinary understandings celebrate
generals who are in the thick of the troops, not emperors who rule from distant palaces. If
CEOs are seen as chief executives of quasi-governmental organizations dedicated to
creating a public service (in the form of useful products or decent jobs), or even if they
are merely leading an organization with its own will-to-live, the pay and perquisites of
recent decades will seem dysfunctional and disturbing. Dictators, not democratic leaders,
use their positions to enrich themselves.
Firms are bureaucracies, and any bureaucracy is limited by its ability to process
information up and down the hierarchy. Vast social gaps between the decision-makers at
the top and the actors at the bottom predictably lead to bad decisions and poor
implementation. This is why we expect democratic armies to outperform aristocratic ones
and egalitarian capitalist economies to outperform dictatorial ones of the left or the right.
No doubt, alternative stories can be told-perhaps there are leaders who are so smart and
so charismatic that they can successfully lead without communication from those below
them-but their proponents fight an uphill battle. Astronomical CEO salaries, prima
facie, will look like dereliction of duty if the core of the CEOs duty is to rally the troops
or listen to them (and the relevant troops are the employees).
Share-centered understandings of the corporation-by defining the corporate team
as its shareholders, labeling the employees outsiders, and suggesting (at least implicitly)
that the only tools available to induce employee work are market pay and the threat of
firing, conceal this common-sense understanding of internal corporate dynamics. If the
central problem of corporate leadership is not overcoming the bureaucratic problems of
communication but rather assuring that CEOs have common interests with shareholders,
high CEO pay can appear as a solution instead of a central part of the problem. CEOs,
thus, have a tremendous incentive to accept and promote the share-centered metaphors: in
the share-centered corporation, they are doing their duty by making themselves into the
new American aristocracy.1 39 The rest of us, however, must worry that by turning our
CEOs into rational maximizers, we are threatening the basis of our economic success.
139. See supra note 119.
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4. Where ShareholderReturns Come From

The short answer to the puzzle of shareholder returns, then, is this: shareholders
receive returns because directors and CEOs believe they are entitled to them. That belief
is not based on any compelling economic, moral or legal argument. However, CEOs who
wish to justify seizing a significant part of the corporate surplus for themselves find the
share-centered metaphors of the corporation more comfortable than the alternatives, and
CEOs, unlike shareholders, have actual economic and political power in the corporation.
Outside the chief executive's office, the share-centered metaphors also have some appeal:
they offer an explanation of a world that would otherwise seem unfair, exploitative, antidemocratic and dysfunctional. If corporations exist for the sake of their shareholders, then
perhaps their employees, customers and neighbors have no legitimate complaint when
they are treated as no more than means to an end not their own. And if you are being
treated that way, it may be more appealing to have an explanation than simply a
simmering sense of injustice.
VI. THE

SIGNIFICANCE

Shareholders are not entitled to the residual by law or nature. Indeed, the
shareholder theory of value-that all extra value belongs to the shareholders-is little
more than a mirror-imaged imitation of Adam Smith and Karl Marx's labor theory of
value, which postulated that all the returns to enterprise were created by labor and, as a
matter of natural law, belong to laborers. 140 As a matter of economics, the shareholder
theory of value is even more wrong than the labor theory of value. Labor alone, without
capital, leads to poverty. Capital alone, without labor, is simply barren. Modem
economies require both, as well as elaborate mechanisms for governing them.
A. The Strugglefor Surplus is Political

Instead, the struggle for the corporate surplus-the residual-is a political struggle
over economic rents to which no party has any special claim precisely because it would
not exist but for the contribution of all the claimants. From an economic perspective, the
shareholders, as fully fungible providers of a fully fungible commodity, have less claim
than most. From a political perspective, the power of the shareholder claim depends on
the power of the shareholder role, which, as we have seen, is more limited than a casual
student of the corporate governance literature might imagine.
The key weapons the shares have are two. First, an ideological claim to entitlement,
founded in the metaphors of ownership, contract, and agency. A full explication of the
rhetorical force of these metaphors is beyond the scope of this essay.1 4 1 However, it
should now be clear that their force is indeed simply rhetorical. As a matter of law,
neither property, contract, nor agency entitle shareholders to the residual; indeed, if the
shares had the rights associated with those rules, they would have no need of ideological
claims in order to seize what would be their own. It is precisely because public
shareholders are not owners of the corporation, not entitled to the residual by contract,

140. See, e.g., KARL MARX, THEORIES OF SURPLUS VALUE 107-16 (Int'l Pubs. 1952) (1863).
141. See supra note 119.
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and not the principals of the corporation that defenders of shareholder entitlements feel
the need to so strenuously insist that they are. As a matter of extra-legal moral claim, the
claim that shareholders ought to be treated as if they were owners or principals or as if
they had contracted for rights they have not obtained in the market, is simply a demand
for redistribution to the rich.
Second, in recent decades top management has found the rhetoric, and sometimes
the reality, of share-centeredness useful for its own purposes. Managers, nearly everyone
agrees, are fiduciaries for the corporation with no independent claim to ownership or
entitlement. So long as this remains the law and the social understandings, CEOs must
justify their actions as on behalf of the corporation, not themselves. The share-centered
views of the corporation conveniently rationalize high CEO pay and perquisites-if
CEOs are major shareholders, they are more likely to think like shareholders than like
employees. Moreover, by viewing the stock market rather than the bureaucracy as central
to corporate life, the share-centered metaphors distract attention from the ineffectiveness
of our modem CEO aristocrats and their failure to create decent jobs at decent wages.
B. Making PoliticalSense of the Corporation'sStruggles
If the shareholders' claim to the residual is an ideological demand for rents in a
fundamentally political struggle for power within the corporation, it follows that citizens
are free to debate the merits of their claim. We are free to intervene to help or hinder the
stock market's attempts to remake the world in its image, without fearing that we are
fighting an ineluctable rule of capitalism. Indeed, we are free even to intervene to help
employees-or any other corporate participant-to win more of the corporate surplus.
The corporate world will survive and thrive if CEO pay shifts a decimal point, if
sharehalders earn returns of 8% rather than 18%, or if employees routinely take virtually
all the gains of increased productivity instead of, as has been the pattern of the last
several decades, virtually none. Efficiency never requires that one particular party win the
surplus fiom cooperation.
As Coase pointed out long ago, the primary explanation for the corporate dominance
economy is that the bureaucratic business form is able to out-produce markets. 142
our
of
Corporations create value that would not exist absent the enterprise itself. The legal rule
that corporate surplus belongs to the corporation reflects the underlying reality that it is a
product of the corporation itself-that is, it is a result of the cooperative enterprise of all
the various corporate stakeholders. Corporate surplus is the gains from the enterprise, not
from any one or another of its participants.
Any realistic view of corporate law must begin, then, with the reality of the
corporation. Like most collective wholes, social or otherwise, corporations are more than
simply the sum of their parts. Just as dividing an individual human into her component
organs, cells or chemicals would provide only a partial view of the complete person,
dividing a corporation into its parts hides something crucial.
The corporate entity is a self-governing, partially autonomous, semi-sovereign
organization. Its internal decision-making is affected by market pressures, but is no more
the unmediated deterministic result of market conditions than any other political decision.

142. Coase, supra note 37.
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Rather than being the simple result of free contracting in a spot market, the internal
processes of corporations are complex mixtures of bureaucracy, contract, and agency,
under the supervision of a board answerable to its nominal subordinate the CEO, to its
electors (the shareholders voting according to the plutocratic principle of one-dollar-onevote), to the stock market as a whole through its determination of stock price, and to the
legal fiction of an undiversified shareholder with no other interest in the corporation or
the societies in which it functions. 143
Looking at the firm in this way, the next steps in the debate are obvious. If
corporations are semi-autonomous, semi-sovereigns with many state-like characteristics,
they are remarkably unsatisfactory quasi-states in a democratic world. Most of their
constituents have no vote at all. The one role that does, shareholders, has its votes
allocated per dollar instead of per person. The power of the leader is near dictatorial; if
CEOs do not have the power of torture or the gulag, they do retain the right of summary
expulsion from the community. We have no adequate countervailing structures inside the
organization to balance foolish or corrupt leaders-there is no internal corporate
equivalent to cabinet government, ombudsmen, separation of powers or even the rule of
law and judicial review.
Poor corporate organization is not as disastrous as dictatorial political government
because unusually badly-run corporations are more restrained by the market. In the
medium run, unusually inefficient or corrupt organizations are killed by market
competition. Still, when an Enron or a Drexel Burnham is destroyed for corruption, or a
major airline, old-line steel corporation, or major automobile company collapses out of
incompetence or excessive rigidity, many innocent people suffer, losing jobs, pensions,
and communities. This disruption, of course, is not nearly as bad as the warfare typically
necessary to overthrow seriously dysfunctional governments, but nonetheless it creates a
significant amount of unnecessary human suffering. Darwinian selection is almost as
cruel and coarse a tool for regulating human societies as in nature-if we have the option
of intelligent design to make functional organizations, we ought to use it.
Market competition, however, comes with no more guarantees than does Darwinian
evolution. Extinction and death are always possibilities even for interesting or useful
organisms, organizations, or, frighteningly, systems. Indeed, even success can lead to
disaster. Sometimes biological evolution creates organisms that exploit their environment
so efficiently that they destroy it-think of cancers or virulent viruses. 144 Our current
corporate law and financial markets are efficiently replacing businesses that viewed
employees and jobs as central to their mission with self-interested kleptocrats. We need
to worry that our newly "incentivized" CEOs may yet kill the democratic goose that lays
our golden eggs.

143. On the legal fiction of a shareholder, see Greenwood, supra note 37; on the varieties of decisionmaking procedures in a democratic polity, see Greenwood, supranote 19, at 789-90.
144. 1 am using the viral metaphor loosely, as an image of potential economic problems rather than literal
extinction, But see JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: How SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED (2005)

(describing human societies that efficiently exploited their environment until they destroyed their own
underpinnings); ELIZABETH KOLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE: MAN, NATURE AND GLOBAL
WARMING (2006) (suggesting that current economic processes threaten global survival); MITCHELL, supra note
3 (describing corporations as "externalizing machines").
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C. Beyond Determinism:Market Pros and Cons
The theories of economic determinism failed in the communist regimes. They fare
no better in the capitalist ones. The role of shareholders in the public corporation is open
for debate.
The stock market has proven immensely useful in offering start-up funding for
certain kinds of organization. Perhaps it sometimes also provides an insurance function
for established firms, helping less diversified corporate participants to weather the
inevitable fluctuations of life under capitalism. The market effectively assimilates certain
types of public information and usefully signals the consensus (although if the market
consensus were an adequate basis for running companies, managers would be unable to
charge anything for their services).
On the other hand, the stock market is unable to reflect the full range of human
values important to a democratic society. It values only what is priced; whatever cannot
be bought is of no interest to it. The capital markets are time and risk indifferent, since
they can discount the future to the present and diversification eliminates particular
commitments; people, however, are always deeply situated and can exist only in
particular places, at particular times, and with particular projects. The market, therefore,
will always press us in the direction of the radical revolutions and creative destructions of
capitalist markets, even when all of us might be inclined to be a little more conservative.
Diversified portfolios have no strong interest in the sorts of competition that are essential
for capitalist functioning; a shareholder that holds both CostCo and Walmart, Chevron
and windmills, American factories and Chinese ones, polluters and pollution control
suppliers, or guns and butter rationally should not care which business model prevails.
Similarly, ordinary competition between different firms in the same industry will appear
as no more than an unfortunate way to divert corporate profits to consumers (who,
unfortunately, are not publicly traded).
Not least, markets redistribute wealth upwards, but never downwards. Voluntary
trade can happen only when both sides find them worthwhile and the diminishing
marginal utility of money assures that the rich will always require more of an inducement
than the poor. Thus, giving governance of our most powerful institutions to the stock
market guarantees that they will be forces for inegalitarianism. It is not accidental that the
increased power of the stock market in our public corporations since the 1980s coincided
with the enormous expansion of the pay gap between top executives and ordinary
employees. Inequality, in turn, is deeply troubling both from democratic and economic
perspectives. Inside the corporation, greater inequality necessarily leads to decreased
solidarity; employees who think they are being taken by the company are more likely to
take from it. 145 Outside the firm, relative equality is a prerequisite both to democratic
145. See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE 381 (George Simpson ed., John A. Spaulding & George Simpson
trans., Free Press 1951) (on the importance of solidarity); E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 81, 187, 200-01, 238 (1988) (marshaling evidence that perceived
procedural fairness results in increased compliance, acceptance of legitimacy of outcome, and loyalty to
institution, regardless of merits of decision); Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 1, at 790 (describing team spirit or
loyalty as useful because it reduces shirking). Similarly, perceived justice is essential if those the institution
wishes to reprimand are to see and react to sanctions as punishment (to be internalized) rather than oppression
(to be resisted). See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Restorative Justice & The Jewish Question, 2003 UTAH L.

REV. 533, 552 n.59 (2003) (describing the significance of the punishment/oppression distinction).
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republican government and to avoiding Keynsian demand-deficit depressions.
VII. CONCLUSION
The issue of how much power to give to the stock market, how much to give to
democratic processes, and how much to leave to unguided professionals is the key
political question of the corporation. The distribution of the surplus is part of the issue,
but perhaps less important than more fundamental issues of how we want our public
corporations to operate, towards which goals, and with what relationship to the people
who make them up. So far, the defense of the share-centered corporation has proceeded
mainly by invoking rhetorical claims to a supremacy that simply does not exist. But
metaphors of ownership or agency are no substitute for social analysis-the question is
not whether shareholders "are" owners of the corporation, but whether giving them so
much power in the corporate-governance structure is good for society as a whole.
The alliance of convenience between CEOs and the stock-market has proven only
partially productive, and the metaphors of share-centeredness have not helped us to
understand the world we live in. The academic task is, first, to fully elucidate the false
metaphors, and second, to shift the debate's imagery to metaphors that illuminate instead
of concealing. The political task is to find a model which produces wealth for all, not just
a small elite; which promotes decent work places and productive careers, not just
consumers' playgrounds; which respects our ecosphere, not just a narrow vision of the
econosphere.

